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In Fulﬁllment of the Written Work Requirement
1Abstract
This paper explores the way in which enforcement actions by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
interact with certain constitutional rights, and it queries whether the system does its most to protect those
rights while preserving the public interest in safety. The paper is essentially an analysis of the intersection
of section 304 of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, involving FDA seizures, with the due process and
just compensation clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The due process section of
the paper relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry. The just
compensation section provides a review of select takings cases, including in particular Miller v. Horton and
Jarboe-Lackey Feedlots, Inc. v. United States. At the end of each of these sections is a thought section
discussing whether the law should be changed. There is also a brief analysis of the relationship of seizure
law to the Fourth Amendment. The paper’s conclusion is that the current state of aﬀairs is not a disaster
but could be improved.
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The protection of the public from impure or dangerous food and medicines has long been a primary concern
of federal and state law enforcement.1Few would question the government’s motives in ensuring the public’s
access to safe and untainted products through appropriate means such as the seizure power. Nevertheless,
even where the overall scheme is well-meant, we must be vigilant. Zealous law enforcement can, if unchecked,
lead to the infringement of personal rights.2In this paper, I will explore the way in which enforcement actions
by the Food and Drug Administration interact with certain constitutional rights, and I will query whether
the system does its most to protect those rights while preserving the public interest in safety.3
1See, e.g., Peter Barton Hutt, Government Regulation of the Integrity of the Food Supply, 4 Annual Review of Nutrition
1 (1984) (discussing the historical background of food and drug law), as reprinted in Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A.
Merrill, Food and Drug Law, Cases and Materials 1-4 (2d ed. 1991).
2See, e.g., James A. Adams, The Supreme Court’s Improbable Justiﬁcations for Restrictions of Citizens’ Fourth Amendment
Privacy Expectations in Automobiles, 47 Drake L. Rev 833, 838 (1999) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s emphasis on police and
governmental eﬃciency rather than valid privacy expectations in the Fourth Amendment context). Adams notes: “Thus, we
must care about the principles applied by the Supreme Court in assessing our right to be secure against the government because
the drafters recognized that the danger to a free society begins with a misguided or, potentially, a malevolent government.” Id.
3Disclaimer: because current law tends to immunize FDA action, I generally approach the subject from the perspective of
the aggrieved individual property owner. I do recognize, however, that in many if not most cases, the property owner is in fact
a large, faceless corporation, and that the FDA is not Big Brother but rather a crucial bulwark against would-be wrongdoers.
4I. Introduction
Seizure under the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 19384applies to all Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) regulated commodities, including foods5, drugs6, cosmetics7, and medical devices.8Prohibitions
against adulteration and misbranding in the FD&C Act have been construed broadly. “If a drug is mis-
branded in any one respect, it is subject to condemnation under 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1).”9An entire shipment
may be seized, even where only a small part of the shipment is proved adulterated.10Conversely, the gov-
ernment may seize less of the merchandise than its warrant speciﬁes.11 Section 304(b)12of the FD&C Act
indicates that its seizure provision is meant to mirror the same procedure in admiralty (although it notes ex-
plicitly that parties may request jury trials).13The Supreme Court has said in construing a similar provision
421 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. [hereinafter FD&C Act]. Some cases below fall under the Act’s 1906 predecessor. I will only note
this where it is relevant to the discussion, either because the 1938 Act is substantively diﬀerent in a given instance or because
the general case law has shifted after 1938.
521 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1). See, e.g., U.S. v. 302 Cases, 321 Cases, and 420 Cases, More or Less of Frozen Shrimp, Currently
Located at Americold Corp., 25 F.Supp.2d 1352, 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 77 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (adulterated shrimp).
621 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1). See, e.g., U.S. v. Undetermined Quantities of Various Articles of Drug ...Equidantin Nitrofurantoin
Suspension..., 675 F.2d 994 (8th Cir. 1982) (adulterated animal drug called “Equidantin”). Counterfeit drugs and items used
to store or produce them may be seized under § 334(a)(2)(A) and (B).
721 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1). See, e.g., U. S. v. Roux Laboratories, Inc., 437 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1971) (material question of fact
as to whether additives in “Roux Lash and Brow Tint” rendered it adulterated and hence subject to FDA seizure).
821 U.S.C. § 334(a)(2)(D). See, e.g., United States v. An Article of Device “Theramatic,” 715 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1983)
(diathermy machine). Formerly, devices were regulated, like food, drugs, and cosmetics, under § 334(a)(1), but the Act was
amended in 1976. Pub.L. 94-295, § 3(c)(1), (2), (3) (1976).
9U. S. v. Article of Drug * * * (BIFLAV-C-2) * * *, 292 F.Supp. 346 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (drugs were misbranded within the
meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1) and (2), because, among other things, the plastic packets, containing 28 tablets each, did not
bear a label containing the information required by that section).
10E.g., U.S. v. 935 Cases, More or Less, Each Containing 6 No. 10 Cans of Tomato Puree, 65 F.Supp. 503, 504 (N.D. Ohio
1946) (“If the samples are reasonably representative of the lot shipped – that is, taken at wide random from the entire shipment
it is in my opinion suﬃcient to embrace the entire shipment in the condemnation.”).
11E.g., U. S. v. Sixty-Five Casks Liquid Extracts, 170 F. 449, 455 (N.D.W. Va. 1909) (“The warrant being for the whole
shipment, the government, if it had the right of seizure at all, could take the whole or any part it could ﬁnd in the original
packages.”).
1221 U.S.C. § 334(b).
13The application of admiralty rules is particularly relevant to Fourth Amendment analysis. For these considerations, see
part IV, infra.
5of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act:
We do not think it was intended to liken the proceedings to those in admiralty beyond the
seizure of the property by process in rem, then giving the case the character of a law action,
with trial by jury if demanded, and with the review already obtaining in actions at law.14
After the property has been seized and the suit brought against the goods themselves, then, the case will
be treated as a civil suit, and the government must prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence.15
It is self-evident that when the FDA through one of its agents or the U.S. Marshall seizes a product from
a company, that company has been deprived in some way of its property. The question arises as to the
constitutionality of such an action. Although many provisions of the Constitution are relevant to seizure
law, this paper will focus on the Fifth Amendment, and in particular, on issues of due process and just
compensation (also known as takings doctrine).16I will look at case law involving the FDA as well as related
state and federal agencies, insofar as any action undertaken by these bodies comes in conﬂict with the Fifth
Amendment. To the extent that the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause is implicated, it will be
referenced, as well as relevant state provisions. I will also touch on the Fourth Amendment as it relates
to the warrant requirements for government agents intending to seize goods. The paper will begin with a
focus on due process, as it brings up issues of fundamental fairness that will be important throughout the
discussion.
15U.S. v. Food, 2,998 Cases, 64 F.3d 984, 989 (5th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing between administrative hearings for seized
imported goods under 21 U.S.C. § 381 and judicial hearings under § 334, and noting that the standard under the latter is “a
preponderance of the evidence”).
16For related issues involving other parts of the Constitution such as the First Amendment and the Commerce Clause see,
e.g., Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C. v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (in suit contesting
FDA seizure of certain devices and accompanying literature from Church of Scientology, court determined that where church
made prima facie showing of legitimacy of religion, its literature was protected by First Amendment from scrutiny of truth
or falsity of its claims), and U.S. v. Depilatron Epilator Model No. DP-206 Universal Technology, Inc., Woodbridge, Conn.,
473 F.Supp. 913 (S.D. N.Y. 1979) (holding that where Congress had rational basis for ﬁnding nexus between intrastate sale
and interstate commerce, regulation was constitutional). See generally Margaret Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Food and Drug
Law, 74 Tulane L. Rev. 815 (2000). These topics are outside the scope of this paper.
6II. The Seizure Power and Due Process
A. Foundations: Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry
In the ﬁrst instance, one must ask whether the constitutionality of FDA seizures is an issue that really
matters. After all, the number of FDA seizures has decreased drastically over the last sixty years.17Seizures
are generally not intended to destroy a company; more often than not, a seizure action will be conﬁned to
an “identiﬁable lot of product and does not involve, for example, a major processing problem which aﬀects
all the products produced at the facility.”18Can we assume that, if seizures are so rare, the FDA must be
acting only in the most egregious cases? Moreover, if only a handful of corporations face the possibility of
seizure, need we concern ourselves with their fates?
To answer, we must begin with the premise that the Constitution does not deal with how many are aggrieved,
but whether those who are have valid reason to be.19Whether they have reason to be depends on the criteria
one uses; one might rely on the agency’s intentions, but from a broad perspective it is diﬃcult to tell from
FDA statistics whether the agency had the right motives in a particular case. It is clear that seizure is a
powerful device and one that can be used by the FDA to threaten corporations even where a seizure is not
ultimately conducted.20Other forms of FDA enforcement may not be as eﬀective without seizure looming in
17See, e.g., Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law, Cases and Materials 1205 (2d ed.
1991). The authors list the following statistics in regard to FDA seizures: 1939 – 1,861 seizures; 1951 – 1, 341; 1963 – 1,049;
1976 – 317; 1989 – 144. Similarly, criminal prosecutions declines from 626 in 1939 to 16 in 1989. Id.
18David F. Weeda, FDA Seizure and Injunction Actions: Judicial Means of Protecting the Public Health, 35 Food Drug
Cosmetic L.J. 112, 118 (February 1980). Mr. Weeda explains that so-called “mass seizures,” operations that can essentially
shut down a factory and have “a chilling eﬀect on that ﬁrm’s current production,” do occur (usually for poor food storage
conditions or deviations from good manufacturing practices), but much more infrequently than lot seizures. Id.
19See, e.g., Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 1074-75 (2000) (holding that homeowner
could assert equal protection claim as class of one).
20See, e.g., Nancy L. Buc, Esq., FDA Enforcement 1991: Some Questions, 47 Food and Drug L.J. 149, 153-4 (1992)
7the background. Seizure is, then, such a powerful device that it requires an examination as to its fairness,
an inquiry into whether the FDA has too much discretion.
State and federal courts have sanctioned the use of seizure by government agents since 1906 (the date of
the precursor to the FD&C Act) and earlier.21Concerns surrounding the constitutionality of the device,
however, have also long been extant.22A seminal case that tackles due process issues is Ewing v. Mytinger
& Casselberry,23which involved the FDA seizure of eleven lots of a dietary supplement called Nutrilite.24
The corporation in this case, Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., was accused of misbranding its product. The
product itself was apparently harmless,25but the Court noted that it would not be the arbiter of what made
Nutrilite worthy of seizure:
(questioning whether it is fair to use seizure as in terrorem means to compel acquiescence to FDA demands).
21See, e.g., U. S. v. Sixty-Five Casks Liquid Extracts, 170 F. 449, 455 (N.D.W. Va. 1909); North American Cold Storage
Company v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 29 S.Ct. 101 (1908); Munn v. Corbin, 44 P. 783 (Colo.App. 1896).
22See, e.g., Armour Packing Co. v. Snyder, 84 F. 136, 139 (D. Minn. 1897) (due process concerns regarding seizure under
oleomargarine law of Minnesota).
23339 U.S. 594, 70 S.Ct. 870 (1950). This paper will examine this case in depth with the general approach of ‘what does
this case tell us about due process in relation to seizure law?’ With the exception of multiple seizures, this case was not the
ﬁrst to rule on the constitutionality of most of these questions, but it does shed light on many of them and is therefore a
good case for discussion purposes. The litigation involving claimant’s due process rights was merely one part of a contentious
battle regarding the Nutrilite product, which ended when the manufacturers agreed to a consent decree. See Lester L. Lev,
The Nutrilite Consent Decree, 7 Food Drug Cosmetic L.J. 56 (January 1952). Although outside the scope of this paper,
1952’s Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal also contains pertinent discussions on the question of restitution from the producer
to the consumers who were allegedly swindled in purchasing Nutrilite (a point upon which FDA did not prevail in the decree).
See John Philip Noland, Section 302(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Restitution Reexamined, 7 Food Drug
Cosmetic L.J. 373 (June 1952); Charles S. Rhyne, Penalty Through Publicity: FDA’s Restitution Gambit, 7 Food Drug
Cosmetic L.J. 666 (October 1952).
24A combination of “alfalfa, water cress, parsley and synthetic vitamins,” Mytinger and Casselberry at 595, the booklet that
accompanied the supplement indicated its use for such diverse ailments as low blood pressure, high blood pressure, overweight,
underweight, easily tired, gas in stomach, ﬂabby hysterical tendency, eczema, lack of ambition, craving for sour foods, arthritis,
deafness, and night blindness, among many others. Id. at 597 n.4.
25Id. at 595. Besides the Court acknowledging as much, the ingredients suggest this, as well.
8[Congress] may conclude, as it did here, that public damage may result even from harmless
articles if they are allowed to be sold as panaceas for man’s ills.... For all we know the most
damage may come from misleading or fraudulent labels. That is a decision for Congress,
not us.26
Although dicta, this is an important statement, as it emphasizes the Court’s willingness to defer to Con-
gressional judgment as to the justiﬁcation behind property deprivations. A company may be deprived of its
product even where harmless, with apparently no determination by the Court as to the appropriateness of
such an action.
If the purpose of seizure is solely to protect the public, this seems a strange result. Governmental agents
are accorded the power of seizure as part of their police powers to insure the health and safety of the
public.27The Court, in forgoing the determination as to whether the alleged violation was a real danger to
society, left itself open to Justice Jackson’s criticism in his dissent that the FDA can use seizures “with a
purpose to harass” the owner of the property, a statement the Court did not refute.28The FDA’s actions,
even if not malicious, can amount to harassment all the same.29This is especially true in light of the fact that
in some instances courts will not let the FDA revoke its seizure of an item without a hearing, thus forcing
27See, e.g., North American Cold Storage Company v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315, 29 S.Ct. 101, 104 (1908) (“The
right to so seize is based upon the right and duty of the state to protect and guard, as far as possible, the lives and health of
its inhabitants, and that it is proper to provide that food which is unﬁt for human consumption should be summarily seized
and destroyed to prevent the danger which would arise from eating it.”). The North American Cold Storage Court, it should
be noted, is also highly deferential to the legislature.
28Mytinger and Casselberry at 604 (Jackson, J., dissenting). But see Southeastern Minerals, Inc. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 758,
764-65 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that district court could not enjoin FDA from visiting and inspecting manufacturer’ plants
except insofar as such visits were harassing).
29Nancy L. Buc tells the following anecdote:
In one situation the FDA sent a regulatory letter to a company, which answered almost immediately with a detailed response
as to why its conduct was lawful. The company then heard nothing for about six months, whereupon it was reinspected and,
very soon, had its goods detained by the FDA. The company asked for a hearing, as was its right, but on the morning of
the day on which the detention hearing was scheduled for the afternoon, the FDA cancelled the detention hearing and seized
the goods.... First, the agency seems to have assiduously denied itself the opportunity to consider the company’s views, and
to seek an agreement instead of litigation. Second, the feel of that sequence, especially cancelling [sic] the detention hearing,
virtually invites confrontation. One can understand and agree with the need for the FDA to act decisively where there is a
health or safety risk, but it is hard to see such a risk in a situation which the FDA did not deal with at all for six months, and
even harder to see why there was not time to listen when the goods were already detained.
Buc, supra note 20, at 150-51.
9the owner to bear the deprivation even where the administrative body responsible for the action no longer
can justify it.30 A second important attribute of this case is that the alleged mislabeling was in the form
of a booklet that accompanied the product. Because the supplement was sold with the booklet, the FDA
could seize both the booklet and the supplement, even though, as noted, the supplement itself was apparently
innocuous.31The picture that emerges is one of vast agency authority: the ability to seize a harmless product
when an accompanying brochure makes apparently unjustiﬁed boasts about the product. In the due process
context, this seems like broad discretion, indeed.
B. Notice and Hearing
Preliminaries aside, the crucial due process question in relation to seizure law is whether both notice to the
potentially aggrieved party of the impending action and a hearing to determine whether the action will be
justiﬁed are required before the FDA can act to seize someone’s goods. Mytinger and Casselberry stands for
the proposition that, under the Fifth Amendment, “no hearing at the preliminary stage is required by due
process so long as the requisite hearing is held before the ﬁnal administrative order becomes eﬀective.”32In
other words, an item may be seized and the legitimacy of the seizure determined later. In the Supreme
Court’s 1908 case North American Cold Storage Company v. City of Chicago,33it determined that it was
30See, e.g., U. S. v. 893 One-Gallon Cans, More or Less, etc., Labeled Brown’s Inhalant, 45 F.Supp. 467, 470 (D. Del. 1942)
(articles may not be released for storage on bond to claimant before judicial determination of misbranding issue); see also U.
S. v. Alcon Laboratories, 636 F.2d 876, 883 (1981).
31Id. at 596-8. See also U.S. v. 8 Cartons, Containing “Plantation ‘The Original’ etc., Molasses,” 103 F.Supp. 626, 628
(W.D.N.Y. 1951) (“The seizure relates not to books oﬀered for bona ﬁde sale but to copies of the book claimed to be oﬀending
against the Act by being associated with the article ‘Plantation’ Blackstrap Molasses in a distribution plan in such a way as to
misbrand the product.”).
32Mytinger and Casselberry at 598. See also, e.g., U.S. v. Undetermined Quantities of Clear Plastic Bags of an Article
of Drug for Veterinary Use, 963 F.Supp. 641, 646 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that it is not a violation of due process for the
government to seize property under the FD&C Act without holding a prior hearing).
33211 U.S. 306, 29 S.Ct. 101 (1908).
10constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment for the city of Chicago to seize and destroy food in cold
storage without a preliminary hearing.34A post-seizure hearing as to the legitimacy of the action in that case
seems to lack teeth, but it may be said to be better than nothing.
Whether notice and a preliminary hearing were required was not originally clear under the FD&C Act’s 1906
precursor. Section (§) 10 of the 1906 Act regulated seizure actions but was silent on the subject. Section (§)
4 of the Act, however, stated that upon determining that a food or drug specimen was adulterated, the Secre-
tary of Agriculture was required to give notice and the opportunity for a hearing to its owner.35Some courts,
then, required notice and preliminary hearings in seizure actions, holding that § 4 was controlling.36Many
other courts, however, construed § 4 as unrelated to § 10, which put responsibility for commencing a seizure
action in the hands of the U.S. Attorney. These courts rejected the notice and hearing requirements.37The
Supreme Court, per Justice Lamar, resolved the dispute in U.S. v. Morgan,38reversing the lower court in
stating that a § 4 hearing is not a judicial determination and therefore has no relationship to the requirements
34Id. at 314-16. It is crucial to the Court’s decision that the owner of the property had some means of redress if the seizure
was unfounded, i.e., through a civil action after the destruction of the goods. Id. There is some indication that the authority
for such an action might be peculiar to nuisance law; cf. Sings v. City of Joliet, 86 N.E. 663 (Ill. 1908) (resting the power
to destroy an infected building without hearing on the fact that the disease constituted a nuisance and an emergency). These
aspects of seizure are explored in the takings section, infra part III and note 105.
35Section 4 of the 1906 Act read as follows:
That the examinations of specimens of foods and drugs shall be made in the Bureau of Chemistry of the Department of
Agriculture, or under the direction and supervision of such bureau, for the purpose of determining from such examinations
whether such articles are adulterated or misbranded within the meaning of this act; and if it shall appear from any such
examination that any of such specimens is adulterated or misbranded within the meaning of this act, the Secretary of Agriculture
shall cause notice thereof to be given to the party from whom such sample was obtained. Any party so notiﬁed shall be given
an opportunity to be heard under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed as aforesaid, and if it appears that any of
the provisions of this act have been violated by such party, then the Secretary of Agriculture shall at once certify the facts to
the proper United States District Attorney, with a copy of the results of the analysis or the examination of such article duly
authenticated by the analyst or oﬃcer making such examination, under the authority of such oﬃcer. After judgment of the
court, notice shall be given by publication in such manner as may be prescribed by the rules and regulations aforesaid.
Food and Drugs Act, § 4, 34 Stat. 769, 21 U.S.C. § 11 (1906).
36E.g., U.S. v. Twenty Cases of Grape Juice, 189 F. 331 (2d Cir.1911).
37E.g., U S v. Nine Barrels of Olives, 179 F. 983 (E.D. Pa. 1910) (notice and hearing not a condition precedent to the
bringing of a suit by the United States for violations of Pure Food and Drug Act); U.S. v. Seventy-Five Barrels of Vinegar, 192
F. 350, 353 (N.D. Iowa 1911) (providing notice and hearing after seizure not a violation of due process).
38222 U.S. 274, 280-1, 32 S.Ct. 81, 82 (1911).
11of § 10. According to the Court, notice and the opportunity for a hearing were not required. The Court
seemed to rest its decision entirely on statutory justiﬁcations. It did not address due process, but limited
its constitutional inquiry to a remark about the Fourth Amendment: Justice Lamar notes brieﬂy that the
safeguard for an owner is not notice and a preliminary hearing, but the requirement of a determination of
probable cause before a seizure can take place.39 Mytinger and Casselberry, then, goes further than U.S. v.
Morgan in that it does address the Constitutional issue.40Nevertheless, the Mytinger and Casselberry Court
comes to the same conclusion that probable cause is a suﬃcient safeguard for an aggrieved owner.41This
probable cause determination, however, is not reviewable by a court, as it is “merely the statutory prereq-
uisite to the bringing of a lawsuit.”42 That the FDA can seize someone’s property without a preliminary
determination as to the legitimacy of such an action is a true boon: “[A] seizure eliminates presentation of a
case before a judge until the FDA has already gotten much of what it wants. No matter how weak its case,
the FDA ‘wins’ by seizing.”43
C. Multiple Seizures
Mytinger and Casselberry also stands for the important proposition that multiple seizures may be carried
out before a hearing takes place; a hearing is not required immediately after the ﬁrst seizure as a sort of test
case.44In other words, where a party has several lots of allegedly defective goods, even if spread out across
39Id. at 282.
40Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594, 599, 70 S.Ct. 870, 873 (1950).
41Id. at 598. Courts have sometimes been lax on the probable cause requirement, as well. See, part IV, infra.
42Id.
43Buc, supra note 20, at 152 (arguing for increased use of injunctions instead of seizures).
44Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. at 601.
12the country, the FDA can move to seize all the lots, with the hearing to determine whether such action was
justiﬁed to follow. This can be crippling to a producer;45multiple seizures may be instituted for any alleged
adulteration and in most circumstances for misbranding.46 In a September, 1950, Food Drug Cosmetic
Law Journal article, Lester L. Lev laments the ease with which the FDA can satisfy the Act’s criteria for
misbranded items. The FDA can institute multiple seizure actions merely if the Administrator or her agent
believes that the labeling is misleading in a “material respect.”47Lev describes this sort of discretion as
“loaded with dynamite,”48and points out that “the question as to what is misleading is frequently a very
close one involving sharp diﬀerences of honest opinion.”49 Indeed, the image of what FDA discretion means
has now been enlarged. The FDA can essentially target the entire product line of a particular company based
at best on probable cause, and it is only the discretion of the agency in the ﬁrst instance, and the Attorney
General in the second instance,50that determines whether the product will be held for hearing. This is so,
even though “[t]he devastating eﬀect on a small or medium-sized victim of a many-pronged seizure campaign
cannot be overemphasized.”51Is it fair to leave the deprivation of someone’s livelihood to the whim of an
45The Court acknowledges as much: “It is said that these multiple seizure decisions of the Administrator can cause irreparable
damage to a business. And so they can.” Id. at 599.
46Multiple libels for condemnation may be instituted for misbranding:
(A) when such misbranding has been the basis of a prior judgment in favor of the United States, in a criminal, injunction, or
libel for condemnation proceeding under this chapter, or (B) when the Secretary has probable cause to believe from facts found,
without hearing, by him or any oﬃcer or employee of the Department that the misbranded article is dangerous to health, or
that the labeling of the misbranded article is fraudulent, or would be in a material respect misleading to the injury or damage
of the purchaser or consumer.
21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1).
47Id.
48Lester L. Lev, The Multiple Seizure Bludgeon, 5 Food Drug Cosmetic L.J. 535, 537 (September 1950).
49Id. at 539.
50Mytinger and Casselberry, 339 U.S. at 599.
51Lev, supra note 48, at 537. Lev goes on:
A large number of seizure actions can eﬀectively ruin the morale of the selling organization....The salesmen and store
owners from whose stocks the seizures are made are certain to lose their ardor in pushing the product in the future....Adverse
publicity, which frequently follows the ﬁling of such law suits in the various jurisdictions where they are brought, forever damns
the product in the public mind. The diﬃculty and expense of ﬁling claims of ownership, answers, and bonds in widely separated
13oﬃcial? Consider the complaint by the property owners in North American Cold Storage, that decisions by
the city boards of health determining the ﬁtness of food were made by “men holding ephemeral positions in
municipal bodies...frequently uneducated, and generally unﬁtted to discharge grave judicial functions.”52Of
course, one would tend to think much more highly of FDA oﬃcials and the Attorney General, but the general
sentiment recognizing the fallibility of government agents working in a bureaucracy has bite.
The Mytinger and Casselberry Court responds to this sort of criticism by analogizing seizure to detention in
the criminal law context:
Take the case of the grand jury. It returns an indictment against a man without a hearing.
It does not determine his guilt; it only determines whether there is probable cause to believe
he is guilty.... As a result the defendant can be arrested and held for trial.53
The Court makes a good point – if seizure of the person is acceptable, surely seizure of goods must be, as
well. Grand juries are hardly very discriminating; the FDA probably rejects more potential cases than a
typical grand jury.54
On the other hand, maybe the problem is not fallibility at all, but rather prejudice. A grand jury is a
body of assumedly unbiased citizens rather than an agency with an agenda. Hence, the grand jury gives the
appearance of impartiality, something that was apparently lacking in Mytinger and Casselberry. The Court
seems unconcerned: “Discretion of any oﬃcial may be abused. Yet it is not a requirement of due process that
jurisdictions, and in arranging for consolidation and removal of the actions may be enormous, and, in some cases may be beyond
the claimant’s ﬁnancial ability to meet.
Id. See also National Remedy Co. v. Hyde, 50 F.2d 1066, 1067 (D.C. 1931) (“The prosecution of libels in various courts in
widely separated parts of the United States is unnecessarily oppressive and causing appellant great and unnecessary expense,
and is ruining, and will ruin and destroy, its business and good will.”). Note, however, that National Remedy Co., under the
1906 Act, did not have access to the same consolidation procedures as those companies whose products are seized under the
1938 Act. Cf., e.g., Pharmadyne Laboratories, Inc. v. Kennedy, 596 F.2d 568, 571 n.7 (3d Cir. 1979).
52North American Cold Storage Company v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 317, 29 S.Ct. 101, 105 (1908).
54On the other hand, a proceeding under the FD&C Act is a civil action, so that although the detention of the item, like
the detention of someone before criminal trial, may be based on probable cause, the item itself may be condemned by a
preponderance of the evidence, unlike the criminal who must be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
14there be judicial inquiry before discretion can be exercised.”55Still, the Mytinger & Casselberry Court said it
would not consider the FDA’s intent. Worse yet for the claimant, if the FDA’s motivations are immaterial,
so are those of its adversary. Courts have held that the innocent intentions of an owner are irrelevant.56What
matters is that the property violates the FD&C Act. Courts have upheld seizure actions against due process
claims even when the FDA had not published the regulations that made the product illegal until after the
item was produced.57 To be fair, the result in cases like Mytinger & Casselberry is hardly inconceivable.
The public health may be at risk in a particular instance, and there may be no other way to safeguard the
community apart from seizure. The North American Cold Storage Court notes, in light of the complainant’s
arguments: “[T]he question arises what is to be done with the food in the meantime. Is it to remain with the
cold storage company, and, if so, under what security that it will not be removed?”58This reﬂects a concern
with food and other products under the jurisdiction of the FDA; it is diﬃcult to ensure that a company will
leave its potentially illegal product quarantined until further notice, especially when those products have a
shelf life. Why give corporations an incentive to shred the evidence? The nature of FDA regulated products
is that they are often times ingested, such that they present a great risk of harm to the consumer. Such
products cannot safely be left on the market.59On the other hand, these products are the livelihood of a
55Mytinger and Casselberry, 339 U.S. at 599.
56E.g., U.S. v. 75 Cases, More or Less, Each Containing 24 Jars of Peanut Butter, Labeled in Part (Jars): “Top Notch Brand,”
146 F.2d 124, 128 (4th Cir. 1944) (“Under the Act, condemned goods are subject to seizure and destruction irrespective of the
intent of the manufacturer.”), certiorari denied 325 U.S. 856, 65 S.Ct. 1183.
57See, U.S. v. 900 Cases Peaches, 390 F.Supp. 1006, 1011 (E.D. N.Y. 1975) (denying claim although regulations regarding
canned peaches were passed after peaches were canned). But see United States v. 484 Bags, More of Less, 423 F.2d 839, 842
(5th Cir. 1970) (noting that claim that coﬀee tolerances were not in eﬀect before hearing was “not without equity,” but not
reaching the issue).
58North American Cold Storage Company v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 320, 29 S.Ct. 101, 106 (1908).
59In some cases, the concern that a producer of some good might try to purge her stock before the FDA can implement the
seizure has moved the agency to request embargos, restraining orders, and injunctions against the commodity. Consider Marie
A. Urban, The FDA’s Policy on Seizures, Injunctions, Civil Fines, and Recalls, 47 Food and Drug L.J. 411, 413 (1992):
“[I]f there is a concern that the product will be distributed before seizure can be eﬀected, the agency will asses whether
the dealer will voluntarily hold the product and, if not, will request a state embargo. In the Medical Device Amendments of
1976, there is a provision for administrative detention of devices intended for human use. This enforcement mechanism may be
considered when, among other things, there is a likelihood that signiﬁcant numbers of the devices will be moved before seizure
15corporation, and may be expensive to produce, as well as perishable.
One must consider the requirements of the hearing in this context. A defendant is entitled to a hearing “at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”60In other words, due process puts up a roadblock to the FDA
arbitrarily delaying a condemnation proceeding (even if the agency may arbitrarily seize the item in the ﬁrst
instance), although the exact parameters under which such a hearing must be conducted are not clear. In the
United States v. An Article of Device “Theramatic,” the hearing was delayed several years, but that was in
part due to the owners of the property seeking a settlement, and as such the court did not sympathize with
their plight.61The court did not consider the failure of the rules to explicitly provide for a timely hearing to
be problematic, since eﬀectively the property owner could attain a relatively quick determination via several
diﬀerent methods (a motion to quash the warrant, a motion to dismiss the complaint, a motion for summary
judgment, or the somewhat slower process of a full hearing on the merits of the seizure action).62Nor was
the court concerned by the fact that it was the owner of the device rather than the government that had the
burden of requesting the hearing.63
is eﬀected or the FDA has reason to believe the devices are adulterated or misbranded.
Although an embargo, e.g., might also be constitutionally inﬁrm, for the purposes of this paper it will not be addressed
separately.
60United States v. An Article of Device “Theramatic,” 715 F.2d 1339, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191 (1965)).
61Id. at 1343.
62Id.
63Id. As authority for this proposition, the court points to the case of Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610, 94
S.Ct. 1895, 1901 (1974) (upholding as constitutional Louisiana procedures for sequestration of property by mortgage or lien
holder, including fact that debtor would request hearing).
16The end of all of this is that the due process clause is not the best source of rights for a property owner when
the FDA believes that the her goods violate § 304 of the FD&C Act. Legitimate concerns for the public
welfare stand in the claimant’s way. The question remains, then, whether the power of the FDA is too broad,
and whether in certain circumstances it infringes on the property rights of food, drug, cosmetic, and device
manufacturers. Obviously, public safety is of utmost concern, even where the existence of a business is at
stake. Should we consider, however, the type of harm that the public faces? Is economic harm a suﬃcient
threat to the public to justify this type of deprivation? Should a more careful balance of the harms to the
public versus the proprietor be made? In this next section, I will consider two approaches to certain aspects
of the problem: Lester L. Lev’s proposal regarding multiple seizures and a California court’s approach to
perishables. I will also suggest an analogy to criminal law that might have relevance in the food and drug
context.
D. Proposed Solutions to Due Process Problems
There is not a wealth of existing material proposing changes to the current laws regarding seizure by the
FDA. This probably has something to do with the perceived adequacy of the laws by the public and by
lawyers and judges, but may also have something to do with reduced reliance by the FDA on this method
of enforcement. Regardless, the Constitution cautions us to be cognizant of property deprivations, and we
should not be resistant to eﬀorts to tweak the law where doing so may have a beneﬁcial eﬀect.
One place to start is the issue of agency discretion. As an analogy, consider Whren v. United States,64in which
64517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996).
17the Supreme Court determined that pre-textual traﬃc stops were Constitutional. That case involved the
Fourth Amendment, but the principle is relevant here – that with broad discretion, agents of the government
will always be able to ﬁnd some violation of the law:
For instance, any time oﬃcers see a driver suspected of criminal activity, the oﬃcers can
stop that individual for a bad tail light, failure to signal a turn, no seat belt, following too
closely, or one of my personal favorites riding your bicycle after dark without a light.65
In the food and drug context, as in Whren, something seems amiss when the power of the government is
expansive and the deﬁned crime relatively minor – as may be the case in many instances of misbranding.66In
light of the assumption in Mytinger and Casselberry that arbitrary seizures are permissible,67use of the
seizure power or the threat of the seizure power could be abused.
Lester L. Lev, as noted earlier, criticizes the “danger inherent in the multiple seizure power.”68He points out
that fear of such broad power delayed the passage of the 1938 Act.69He proposes three modiﬁcations to the
law:
6621 U.S.C. § 343. See, e.g., Libby, McNeill & Libby v. United States, 148 F.2d 71, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that tomato
catsup conforming to government standard except for addition of small quantity of sodium benzoate, a harmless preservative,
purported to be tomato catsup notwithstanding fact that it was truthfully labeled as “tomato catsup with preservative,” and
hence was misbranded and subject to condemnation); U.S. v. 254 Cases and 499 Cases, Each Containing 48 Cans, of an Article
Labeled, in part, “Net Contents 10 Oz. Avoir. Baby Brand Tomato Sauce,” 63 F.Supp. 916 (E.D. Ark. 1945) (holding tomato
sauce to be misbranded because it purported to be tomato sauce but was not spiced and contained only 6.5% instead of 8.37%
salt-free tomato solids); United States v. 20 Cases... ‘Buitoni 20% Protein Spaghetti,’ 130 F.Supp. 715 (D.Del.1954) (upholding
the seizure of spaghetti containing 20% Protein as against a permitted maximum of 13%) aﬀ’d on the opinion below, 228 F.2d
912 (3 Cir. 1956).
67See, e.g., Pharmadyne Laboratories, Inc. v. Kennedy, 596 F.2d 568, 571 & n.6 (3rd Cir. 1979).
68Lev, supra note 48, at 538.
69Id.
18That the [FD&C] Act should be amended: (a) To conﬁne the use of multiple seizures in
misbranding cases to those instances in which the article is dangerous to the public health.
(b) To give libel actions preference on the trial calendar. (c) To speciﬁcally authorize the
transfer of libel actions, whether for adulteration or misbranding, to any district, including
the claimant’s home district.70
To begin at the end, proposal (c) aﬀects the ease with which one can defend a libel action.71This proposal,
though, may be a casualty of broad based business. Certainly a company that sells its wares all over the
nation should be prepared to defend in those places, as well. Proposal (b), suggesting that libel actions
receive preference on the trial calendar makes sense,72but may be impractical. It is obviously important that
the issues be resolved speedily, but whether the harm to an individual producer is any greater than, say,
the harm to a criminal defendant awaiting trial, the harm to a child awaiting determination of his custody,
the harm to a tenant awaiting determination of her eviction status, etc., is unclear. Courts deal with many
important issues.
Proposal (a) essentially limits the FDA’s multiple seizure power in borderline or ‘iﬀy’ cases – Lev wants to
abandon the “misleading in a material respect” concept. It is unclear from the proposal whether Lev would
also take away FDA authority in cases of fraudulent labeling. Fraud is a legitimate harm, but as he points,
the emergency in fraud cases is “far less real” than in public health cases.73
Consider Libby, McNeill & Libby v. United States.74It involved the seizure of ‘catsup’ that contained a
71As noted, due process requires a hearing “in a meaningful manner.” United States v. An Article of Device “Theramatic,”
715 F.2d 1339, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191 (1965)).
72As noted, due process requires a hearing “at a meaningful time.” Id.
73Lev, supra note 48, at 537. In the balance, it seems that potentially fraudulent producers should not be able to reap the
fruits of their actions, although this may just give companies an incentive to be negligent instead. There seems to be something
worse about a producer intentionally calling colored water apple juice than a producer accidentally mislabeling her apple juice.
This may be a diﬃcult distinction, however. Unfortunately, the line between fraudulent misbranding and adulteration is also
somewhat unclear. See Paula Kurtzweil, Fake Food Fight, U. S. Food and Drug Administration FDA Consumer (March –
April, 1999) available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼dms/fdfake.html.
74148 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1945).
19small quantity of sodium benzoate, a harmless preservative. The catsup was condemned because it did not
satisfy the labeling standard for “tomato catsup” even though the addition of the preservative was its only
deviation from the standard, and even though the label indicated that it was “tomato catsup with preserva-
tive.”75What if, in a case such as Libby, the FDA wanted to enact multiple seizures? Perhaps the company
can prove that its product is within the statute; the harm to the public is minimal if the FDA is right, but
the harm to the producer is serious if the agency is wrong. Would we be better oﬀ letting the public be
‘deceived’ for a short time, allowing the FDA to enjoin the company from making more of the product,76and
holding a hearing on the ﬁrst batch of catsup that is seized? One can assume under these facts that there
is no health risk to the public, because if there were a danger to the public health, the seizure would be
permissible (even under Lev’s standard) as falling within the ﬁrst exception to § 304(a)(1)(B). Essentially,
then, one must consider the extent to which a violation of the law that causes no harm, or the harm of
which is merely in the ‘deception’, or even the harm of which is to the consumer’s wallet, merits FDA action.
Perhaps we need to separate these categories out, or perhaps, as the Mytinger and Casselberry Court noted,
it is Congress’s job to do so.
Regardless of the merits of this proposal, it emphasizes the importance of balancing harms in a way that is
relevant to a California case, People v. Rath Packing Company, Inc.77Rath involved the alleged violation of
state law, and the relation of state law to the federal Wholesome Meat Act not the FD&C Act,78but the
case contains a valuable discussion of due process. The defendant, Rath Packing Company Inc. (Rath) sold
75Id. at 72-73.
76See Lev, supra note 48, at 544-45.
77149 Cal.Rptr 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
78See id. at 438 n.6 (“The reference to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in section 12211 [of the California Business
and Professions Code] has no bearing on the issues presented in the case at bench since that act expressly excludes meat food
products from its coverage to the extent that its provisions conﬂict with those of the Wholesome Meat Act. (21 U.S.C. s 392.)”).
20packages of bacon that were allegedly short-weighted, that is, that contained less bacon than indicated on
the label. California oﬃcials claimed Rath “intended to and has deceived, misled and otherwise induced
substantial numbers of consuming public into purchasing its bacon products,”79and that the company “was
in violation of California laws prescribing...false advertising....[,] unfair competition...[, and] misbrand-
ing....”80The court determined that the federal law would pre-empt the state law, but that state law could
be employed where it did not conﬂict with the federal standard,81including use of the state’s own enforcement
or sanction mechanisms.82 One of these enforcement mechanisms was the use of California “oﬀ-sale” proce-
dures. Under California law, Business and Professions Code section 12211, oﬃcials can “order the removal
from sale of falsely labeled packages, without provision for notice or hearing, until the particular defect is
cured.”83Although this may be likened to an injunction in that the packages are not actually held by oﬃcials
but returned to Rath, it is closer to a condemnation in that the company has already produced its goods for
sale and shipped them out and is then forced to destroy them as a result of the oﬀ-sale order.84Regardless,
the court held that the oﬀ-sale procedure did not guarantee Rath a hearing during the shelf-life of its bacon,
and therefore that it constituted a denial of due process as applied to Rath.85 The crucial aspect of the
court’s determination that the oﬀ-sale procedures violated due process was its use of a balancing test: “[W]e
79Id. at 436.
80Id. at 436-7. Relevant California provisions include Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500, Cal. Civ. Code § 3369, Cal. Health
& Saf. Code §§ 26550, 26551, and Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 12024, 12024.5, and 12211. Rath, 149 Cal.Rptr at 437-8.
81Rath, 149 Cal.Rptr at 442-3.
82Id. at 443.
83Id. at 447. See also id. at 438 n. 6 (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 12211). The “oﬀ-sale orders may be tested after the fact,
by petition for write of mandamus or action for injunction under state law....” Id. at 447. As such, this is not the case of
seizure with no opportunity at all for a hearing, but rather, like the examples discussed thus far, no notice or opportunity for
a hearing pre-seizure.
84Id. at 447-8. See also id. at 447 (describing how courts have relied on Mytinger and Casselberry in upholding the use of
oﬀ-sale procedures). The weights and measures oﬃcial may also “seize as evidence any package or container which is found to
contain a less amount than represented.” Id. at 438 n.6.
85Id. at 447-8.
21have balanced the public interest sought to be protected, i.e., the right of the consumer to be free from
misbranded goods, against the deprivation suﬀered by Rath.”86The court here took a sophisticated, realistic
approach to the problems raised by seizure law. It considered many of the concerns noted in this paper:
The evidence produced at trial revealed that on at least three occasions....the prescribed
testing procedure resulted in Rath’s bacon being ordered oﬀ sale when it should not have
been.... It may be anticipated that many more such errors will occur when appellants begin
to enforce the more complicated federal standard. Further, the record indicates that Rath
bacon which was actually underweight was only so in miniscule amounts, rarely exceeding a
few fractions of an ounce. We point out, however, that if the governmental interest involved
here was the protection of the public from the consumption of adulterated, and not merely
short-weighted food, we would have to strike the balance in favor of that interest, irrespective
of the fact that the product ordered oﬀ sale is highly perishable.87
The misbranding that took place here, even under the best case for the government, was relatively minor,
and in the worst case, wrong. While this does not mean that Rath should escape punishment for illegal acts,
it does illustrate the beneﬁt of a rational approach.
Just what this rational approach means may depend on the facts at hand. In this case, the court recognized
that a full hearing before the oﬀ sale procedure went into eﬀect would be impractical for government oﬃcials,
and decided that due process required a “ﬂexible” approach.88The court determined some general guidelines
for this type of case: a meat packer like Rath is entitled to notice, reasonably calculated to reach the packer,
and an opportunity for a hearing before the responsible enforcement agency, all within a period that the
product “will not have substantially depreciated in value should it be determined that the detention or
oﬀ-sale order was erroneously issued.”89This corresponds to Lev’s desire that libel hearings be advanced in
the trial calendar, but instead mandates a speedy hearing before the agency instead of the courts.
86Id.
88Id. at 449.
89Id. at 449 & n.23.
22On what basis did the court choose this ﬂexible due process approach? The court points to a trend in
decisions by the U.S. and California high courts recognizing the need to balance the considerations between
the parties in a due process case.90This theory was developed in a number of cases in the 1970’s and beyond,
in the context of beneﬁts terminations, 91 school expulsions,92utility shut-oﬀs, 93andsoon.94It recognizes that
the governmental interest may be important, but that because the Constitution safeguards an individual’s
property rights, the disposition of such a right must be handled carefully.
In some ways, the individual’s right is more abundantly clear in FDA seizure cases than in the cases just
cited; the property right an owner has in her goods for sale is more evident than the ‘property’ right a
student has in getting an education, or an employee has in maintaining her job. Most of these latter cases,
however, do not involve a danger or emergency to the public or the government. The leap that the Rath
court took was in recognizing that the government’s right to act (and, by implication, the public’s right to
be protected) could legitimately be put on the scale with the owner’s private interest. Rath determined that
it was necessary to ﬁgure out what danger the potentially illegal product presented, and to what extent this
danger was real.
Many of these “ﬂexible” due process cases provide the requisite protection by insisting on an administrative
90Id. at 449. The court points to Goss v. Lopez 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729 (1975) (public school students have property
interest in their education, entitled to notice and hearing before long suspension or expulsion from school), Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134, 164, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1649 (1974) (employee has property interest in job and is therefore entitled to notice and
opportunity to respond before discharge; Powell, J., concurring, emphasizing the fairness considerations to each side), and Skelly
v. State Personnel Bd., 124 Cal.Rptr. 14, 539 P.2d 774 (Cal. 1975) (due process required notice and opportunity to respond
before employee could be discharged).
91Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011 (1970) (due process requires that pre-termination evidentiary hearing be
held before public assistance payments to welfare recipient are discontinued).
92Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487 (1985) (process due to terminated school district
employees was pre-termination opportunity to respond, coupled with post-termination hearing).
93Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 1554 (1978) (notice and administrative hearing
required before utility company may discontinue consumer’s services).
94Cf. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 117 S.Ct. 1807 (1997) (recognizing due process right of employee to pre-termination
hearing, but emphasizing the limited nature of that hearing).
23hearing,95as already described in the case of Rath. The requirement of full agency hearings could help resolve
due process problems. Although an agency might not have as many resources as a court, the wisdom of
pursuing a seizure action is something that only the former can take into account when allocating its resources.
Moreover, an administrative hearing need not tax the agency’s resources greatly.96 The advantage of such
a procedure is that it gives the property owner, at the very least, an opportunity to justify her actions, and
it gives the FDA a sense of the likelihood of its success on the merits. Certainly this seems a wise solution
in the misbranding context, where, as described, the emergency may be lacking. Of course, if the agency
determination is reviewable by the courts, eﬃciency is lost and a burden is placed on the judiciary; on the
other hand, without review, the responsible agency is hardly constrained to act any more fairly in the context
of the administrative hearing. The latter concern, however, is probably overstated, as the hearing mechanism
at least provides some accountability and oﬀers the agency the chance to clear up well-intentioned mistakes
on its part.
The mechanism could be something akin to a bail hearing. In the criminal context, the court determines,
based on the various factors that weigh on both sides, the bond that should be set. In some cases, the risk to
the public is too great to merit any type of bail, in other cases, the risk of ﬂight is too great.97Nevertheless,
the court recognizes that in many cases the protected liberty interest is more signiﬁcant than the projected
harm. It does not make sense in the food and drug context to oﬀer bail, per se. The concept, though, of
a judge determining quickly the merits of the case, the harm to the producer, the needs of the agency, the
95Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 263-64; Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46.
96“Aﬀording the employee an opportunity to respond prior to termination would impose neither a signiﬁcant
administrative burden nor intolerable delays.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 544.
97See, e.g., U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (1987) (discussing, in case about Bail Reform Act, factors that
go into bail determination, and holding that protection of community and prediction of dangerousness were valid concerns not
barred by Constitution).
24possibility of multiple libels being brought, etc., can be transported to the food and drug context, on an
administrative or quasi-judicial/quasi-administrative level. The fact that currently there are relatively few
seizures these days only strengthens the argument that this protection is easily provided, if not abundantly
necessary in most cases.
In Rath, constitutional concerns aﬀected actions by California oﬃcials with responsibilities not unlike those
of the FDA. Due process, under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (as well as state constitutions),
is relevant to state oﬃcials, municipal oﬃcials, and federal oﬃcials including agents of the FDA. It is
important to map out consistent principles under the due process clause in order to ensure that these
various governmental agents will act appropriately and fairly in all circumstances.
III. The Seizure Power and the Right Just to Compensation
A. Explanation of the Right
The Fifth Amendment, after setting out an individual’s due process rights, states: “[N]or shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”98Property here is not limited to real prop-
erty.99Despite the language of the Constitution, it is clear that the government may seize private property in
certain instances without providing compensation, as an exercise of its police power. The question, for our
purposes, is in what instances speciﬁc governmental action in seizing property may be seen as an exercise of
its police power as opposed to a taking for public use that requires compensation.
98U.S. Const., amend. V (1791).
99See, e.g., Pete v. U.S., 531 F.2d 1018 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (government action that deprived plaintiﬀs the use of their cabin
barges constituted a taking for which they were entitled to compensation).
25In the case of FDA seizures, the owner of the commodity seized by the administration is deprived of her
property. In the event that the commodity somehow violates a provision of the FD&C Act, however, the
seizure is valid; the product is illegal, and therefore no compensation need be paid. Once it has been
determined that the commodity is illegal, it in fact appears that the claimant loses all property rights to
it whatsoever. In Provimi, Inc. v. U. S.,100claimant’s supply of animal feed and drugs were seized under
the FD&C act as adulterated. Provimi entered into a consent decree authorizing the release of some of the
property for reconditioning,101but the government was dilatory in returning the items, resulting in economic
loss. Provimi claimed that the delay constituted a taking. The Court of Claims determined that once the
items had been condemned (as stipulated in the consent decree), the claimant had no right to have them
returned and therefore was not entitled to compensation for the government’s withholding of the property:
“[P]laintiﬀ had no property right after the condemnation. The statutory scheme plainly works a complete
divestiture of the property rights of the owner of the condemned goods.”102As such, the withholding of the
property between its seizure and its release for reconditioning was not a taking.103
The issue then arises whether a seizure of a product that is not adulterated, misbranded, or otherwise in
violation of the statute but that is seized upon suspicion of such, is a taking that requires compensation.
Underlying this issue are several questions. What sort of behavior merits a taking – must an agent act
100680 F.2d 111 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
101This may be done at the discretion of the court, and requires that the erstwhile owner of the goods pays all the necessary
fees.
102Provimi 680 F.2d at 114.
103The court also determined that the government was not in violation of the reconditioning provisions of the FD&C Act, 21
USC § 334, in that release for reconditioning is discretionary, and therefore the government cannot be in violation of the statute
whatever action it subsequently takes regarding the property. Provimi 680 F.2d at 113-4.
26arbitrarily in seizing a commodity for it to be compensable (assuming it is later shown that the seizure
was unfounded)? What if the oﬃcial acts negligently? In good faith? In bad faith? With probable cause?
Furthermore, what harm must the owner of the property suﬀer in order to be compensated? Is mere loss
of use for a certain amount of time compensable?104Must there be damage to the item? Total destruction?
Moreover, from who can the owner of the property obtain redress? The oﬃcial? The state? Are there laws
that protect the agent’s actions, or that transfer the obligation from the oﬃcial to the state? Finally, given
the relative infrequency with which the FDA pursues seizure actions, the unlikelihood of such an action
going to trial, and the slim possibility that the FDA will lose this kind of case, is there even any reason to
worry about compensation in this circumstance? Although not all of these questions have clear answers, it
is important to keep them in mind in the context of this inquiry. Nevertheless, to the extent that the law
fails to recognize wrongful seizures as compensable acts, the above considerations are mostly theoretical.
B. Origins of Takings Law: Miller v. Horton
In order to understand the takings question more clearly, it is useful to view it from a historical perspec-
tive.105Although there is much takings law, it is helpful to ﬁnd a case that deals with the speciﬁc question
that we have set out: whether wrongful seizures constitute takings. An early, well-known case that ad-
dresses the issue of compensation in this speciﬁc context is Miller v. Horton.106In that case, members of
104The Supreme Court has indicated that a temporary property deprivation may be considered a taking. See, e.g., First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, Cal., 482 U.S. 304, 318, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2388 (1987)
(“These cases reﬂect the fact that “temporary” takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are not diﬀerent
in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.”).
105According to Catherine R. Connors, the just compensation clause has its roots in early English law; the Magna Carta
describes something roughly akin to due process, and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the law began to reﬂect the
concept of compensation. In America, Vermont in 1777 and Massachusetts in 1780 were the ﬁrst to expressly require just
compensation in their state constitutions. Catherine R. Connors, Back to the Future: The “Nuisance Exception” to the Just
Compensation Clause, 19 Cap. U. L. Rev. 139, 148-151 (Winter, 1990).
10626 N.E. 100 (Mass. 1891).
27the Rehoboth, Massachusetts, board of health killed the plaintiﬀ’s horse under a statute that authorized
the destruction of diseased animals. The trial court judge found that the horse was not diseased, but ruled
that the defendants were justiﬁed in destroying the animal.107Oliver Wendell Holmes, before his tenure as a
Supreme Court justice, wrote the decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on appeal, reversing.
The case, at ﬁrst blush, seems mostly about the due process considerations addressed in the ﬁrst part of
this paper. Indeed, Holmes emphasizes the importance of notice and hearing (preferably before seizure and
destruction, but where necessary, afterward), and he implies that if the statute does not give the owner the
opportunity to be heard, the opportunity will come when the owner sues whoever killed his healthy horse.
It is near the end of the decision, however, that Holmes explicitly discusses takings doctrine, stating:
When a healthy horse is killed by a public oﬃcer, acting under a general statute, for fear
that it should spread disease, the horse certainly would seem to be taken for public use108as
truly as if it were seized to drag an artillery wagon. The public equally appropriates it,
whatever they do with it afterward.109
He then goes on to question whether the law sanctions the destruction of healthy animals, and in dictum
suggests that it would be “a serious question” whether such a regulation, if it did not provide compensation
to the deprived owner, could be upheld.110It is not perfectly obvious whether Holmes in fact believes that any
destruction of someone’s horse, whether the animal is diseased or not, is a taking requiring compensation; in
any event he does seem to hold that the wrongful destruction of a healthy horse requires compensation.111
107Id. at 100.
110Id.
111Id. at 101. Holmes does draw a distinction between the destruction of a diseased horse versus a healthy horse, and
determines that the statute does protect the former act. Id. at 102. He notes that in nuisance cases, the legislature may deﬁne
the law narrowly or broadly; it might make a law calling for the destruction of only very sick horses, or of horses altogether.
Id. Holmes states that regardless of how the legislature deﬁnes the nuisance, the owner has the right to question whether his
property ﬁts the legislative description, and if so, whether “the line draw is valid one under the police power.” Id. Holmes seems
to be suggesting that an act could be a taking even if it were to fall on the regulated side of the line – that a law that called for
28The dissent vigorously protests Holmes’ conclusion. Justice Devens emphasizes the “well recognized” dis-
tinction between the power of eminent domain and the police power, the latter of which gives the state the
authority to control property even if to the owner’s disadvantage.112He explains:
[L]aws passed in the lawful exercise of the police power are not made unconstitutional
because no provision is made for compensation to the individual whose property may be
aﬀected thereby. They are passed for the protection of the community against the ravages
of ﬁre, the spreading of pestilence, and the prevention of other serious calamities, and such
property is not taken for any use by the public within the meaning of the constitution....
[The validity of nuisance laws] rests upon the necessity of providing for the public safety,
and the individual is presumed to be compensated by the beneﬁt which such regulations
confer upon the community of which he is a member....113
In Miller, then, we ﬁnd the outline of the takings question. The rights of the parties are eloquently deﬁned:
on the one hand, the individual gives up an asset for the public good, and should be compensated for his
benevolence; on the other hand, the beneﬁt that inures to the individual is that of being a member of the
community. To an extent, the nature of the article in question shapes the debate; the owner of a diseased
horse is not acting in bad faith by owning that horse, which might not be true of, say, a producer who calls
colored water apple juice. It is a framing issue: Holmes seems to empathize with the poor horseman who
is the victim of not one but two inﬂuences outside of his control: Disease and the Board of Health. In this
view, requiring just compensation is a form of insurance. Justice Devens’ dissent implies that the no one can
predict the things that life will throw his way, and that ‘fate happens’ to us all. In his view, neither diseased
nor healthy animals should be compensated for unless the legislature declares it, thus forcing the owner to
self-insure for any harm that might come to his property.114
the destruction of all horses would encompass validly owned horses, and that, if enforced, such a law, though legitimate, would
require compensation to the aggrieved owner.
112Id. at 103 (Devens, J., dissenting).
114Cf. Miller, 26 N.E. at 104 (Devens, J., dissenting): “The contention that the law is unconstitutional, so far as animals
29It is, however, unclear from Justice Devens’ dissent to what extent the governmental regulation needs to be
aimed at the prevention of terrible rather than moderate harms for it to be considered an exercise of the
police power. In his dissent, as quoted above, he seems to imply that traditional nuisance laws were designed
for the prevention of serious calamities.115Although other language in his dissent accords great deference to
the legislature, one wonders whether he would approve of any legislative decree irrespective of its breadth
and the deprivation that it entails. This is important in the modern food and drug context, as the accidental
(or even intentional) misbranding of a condiment116hardly seems to qualify as a serious calamity.
The case also addresses the issue of who may be sued and on what grounds. Justice Devens remarks that the
defendants killed the horse under the auspices of an oﬃcial body (the “commissioners of contagious diseases
among domestic animals”) that was lawfully created by the legislature and that had the legal authority to
grant the board of health power to kill the horse in question.117In other words, the defendants (the board
actually tainted are concerned, cannot be maintained unless it is true that every police regulation aﬀecting the use of property,
or authorizing the destruction of property as dangerous to the community, is unconstitutional except when it provides for
repayment to the owner.”
115There may actually be some distinction between condemnations under the police power and those under nuisance law.
Catherine R. Connors explains that this distinction was ﬁrst articulated by the Supreme Court in Justice Rehnquist’s dissent
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 428 U.S. 104 (1978). She states that under the nuisance exception,
“a court is less likely [than under general laws] to ﬁnd a need for compensation where the regulation at issue suppresses certain
deleterious property uses.” Connors, supra note 105, at 139. According to her, the Penn Central dissent deﬁned the nuisance
exception as applying to the “safety, health, or welfare” of the public and noted that it is not “coterminous with the police
power.” Id. at 141. In other words, (nuisance) laws that speciﬁcally protect the public health might give the state a ﬁrmer
foothold for denying compensation than does the police power in general.
116See, Libby, McNeill & Libby v. United States, 148 F.2d 71, 72-73 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that tomato catsup conforming to
government standard except for addition of small quantity of sodium benzoate, a harmless preservative, purported to be tomato
catsup notwithstanding fact that it was truthfully labeled as “tomato catsup with preservative,” and hence was misbranded
and subject to condemnation)
117Miller, 26 N.E. at 104 (Devens, J., dissenting).
30of health) were merely following orders.118It is interesting to note that the board of health (responsible for
executing the law), the commissioners (whom Justice Devens describes as acting “semi-judicially”), and the
state itself (in part in its executive, in part in its legislative capacity) all bear some responsibility for the
error, and all are potential targets for litigation. Here, the plaintiﬀ chose to sue the board members as
individuals, and the court apparently approves. Again, we have a framing issue: the majority per Holmes
views the defendants not as obedient public servants, but rather as something closer to criminals (or malicious
tortfeasors) who willfully murdered Mr. Miller’s horse. From this perspective, the plaintiﬀ was entitled to
compensation from them.
The statute in Miller provides that the state may compensate individuals whose property is destroyed.119This
legislative solution to the problem may diminish the harshness of an overly harsh nuisance law in certain
instances.120Such a scheme has generally been set up in modern day cases involving the destruction of
diseased animals.121
Although historically important, Miller itself is no longer precisely good law. It has been invalidated on the
issue of immunity for public oﬃcials. Under Miller, oﬃcials who got things wrong were deemed to be acting
118Justice Devens, in his dissent, states that he believes that the board of health oﬃcials should be immune on these grounds:
“[A]s an oﬃcer is protected by his warrant, if it issue from a court having jurisdiction, no matter what previous error may
have been made which led to the issuance of it, so the defendants, who simply executed the decree of a tribunal which was
competent to deal with the subject, and which the legislature had created, cannot be made responsible for any error committed
by it in its adjudication.”
Id. at 104.
119Miller, 26 N.E. at 100.
120And the lack of such a provision might point to some statutory inﬁrmity. See, e.g., John Yensen v. State of Ohio, 1899
WL 761, *10 (Ohio Com.Pl. 1899), where the judge remarked that the statutes’ explicit denial of compensation (or access to
courts to pursue a remedy) was a strong indication that the power granted to local game wardens and sheriﬀs to seize ﬁshnets
was overly broad.
121See, e.g., Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1536 (1990).
31at their own risk. In the 1973 case of Gildea v. Ellershaw,122however, the Supreme Judicial Court eﬀectively
abandoned this rule. Now, public oﬃcials acting in the course of their duties are generally protected, except
in cases of “bad faith, malice or corruption.”123Despite this narrowing of Miller, however, the question
remains whether a property owner has redress when her property is seized wrongfully.
C. Modern Day Claims: Fairness versus the Public Good
The importance of framing the problem in a certain light can be seen in many modern just compensa-
tion cases. One such case is Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services v. Mid-Florida Growers,
Inc.124The Florida Department of Agriculture learned that citrus canker had been detected in the nursery
from which the respondents purchased their trees; on inspection, however, it did not ﬁnd that respondents’
trees were infected. The Department ordered that the respondents’ nursery stocks be burned, nevertheless,
as a public safety measure.125As the trees were healthy, the nurseries claimed that the Department’s action
amounted to a taking requiring compensation; the Department, on the other hand, justiﬁed its action as
necessary “in order to prevent a public harm.”126The court ruled that the burning did in fact amount to a
taking.127
122298 N.E.2d 847, 853 (Mass. 1973) (action for damages for attempted removal from oﬃce).
123Id. at 859.
124521 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1988).
125Id. at 102.
126Id. at 102-3.
127Id. at 103-5. The court also notes that the state’s lack of a possessory interest in the property in no way diminishes the
likelihood that the action was a taking.
32Notably, in Mid-Florida Growers, the taking is not wrongful in the sense that the Department made a
mistake. Rather, the Department consciously destroyed healthy trees as a precautionary measure. The case,
then, tests the limits of governmental authority in regard to the police power – can the government take
direct, intentional action and still be liable?128The court acknowledges that “a regulation or statute may
meet the standards necessary for exercise of the police power but still result in a taking.”129In other words,
there can be a compensable taking even in the face of valid regulatory action under the state’s police powers.
The court cleverly shirks the issue of clarifying the parameters of the police power by framing the agency
action as the creation a public beneﬁt as opposed to the prevention of a harm,130thus leaving the reader to
assume that only the former type of police action will be considered a taking.131Use of one’s property to
beneﬁt the public is compensable, but where one’s property is taken to prevent a public harm, the owner
bears the loss. It is a ﬁne line. The court frames the Department’s action as cautious but unnecessary,
in a sense creating the impression in the reader that harm was not actually imminent. The majority’s
reasoning should strengthen the contention that compensation should lie in the case of a well-intended but
wrongful seizure, if only because such an action may similarly be characterized as a public beneﬁt (because
an unjustiﬁed seizure would not in fact prevent any harm).
128The court notes that the respondent’s were not permitted to challenge the propriety of the action itself, but rather only
the resultant failure to compensate for the damage done. Id. at 103.
129Id. at 103 (emphasis added). In State Plant Board v. Smith, 110 So.2d 401, 405 (Fla. 1959), involving similar facts,
the court also recognized the sometime right to compensation in public nuisance cases, and it explicitly distinguished cases
involving the police power from those in which property has been appropriated for public use.
130“We, however, agree with the district court’s conclusion that destruction of the healthy trees beneﬁted the entire citrus
industry and, in turn, Florida’s economy, thereby conferring a public beneﬁt rather than preventing a public harm.” Mid-
Florida Growers, 521 So.2d at 103.
131Chief Justice McDonald disagrees with the majority’s conclusion on this score. He claims that the Department’s action
was related to the prevention of the spread of citrus canker, which is a public harm. He conceives of the potential outbreak of
the disease as a serious emergency. Id. at 105-106 (McDonald, C.J., dissenting).
33Mid-Florida Growers involved state agencies, state law, and likely, although it is not explicit, the state
constitution.132Jurisprudence under the Federal Constitution is similarly complex. A relevant case under
federal law is Yancey v. United States.133Yancey involved turkey farmers who were forced to quarantine
their healthy birds during an outbreak of avian inﬂuenza, and who ultimately decided to sell their birds at
a loss rather than maintain them (at a loss) in the quarantine.134The scenario in Yancey is comparable to
that in Mid-Florida Growers, in that the Yancey’s turkeys were not diseased, yet they were subject to the
quarantine regulation. A statute authorized that farmers who were forced to destroy their livestock or poul-
try be compensated, but it did not protect those in the Yancey’s position whose ﬂock suﬀered economically
but not physically from the disease.
The court determined that the Yanceys suﬀered a severe setback and that their claim fell within the spirit of
the Fifth Amendment, and it therefore found the loss of value resulting from the quarantine to be compens-
able. This can be contrasted with the result in Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. Hallowell.135The facts of
that case are very similar to those in Yancey; the Third Circuit, however, reached the opposite conclusion. It
cited authority in support of the proposition that the police power gives the state the authority to act in the
public interest and emphasizes the legitimacy of the quarantine.136It noted that, although there was a federal
law in place that provided for payment to those farmers whose stock was destroyed as a result of the disease,
no compensation to those farmers was in fact required; it viewed Empire as being in a comparable position
132Cases may also be brought under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Although the Fourteenth does not
have an explicit just compensation clause, it is understood that the Amendment’s due process guarantees encompass that right.
See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277, 48 S.Ct. 246, 246 (1928) (involving the destruction of cedar trees to prevent
disease). Moreover, the Fifth Amendment applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Webster v. Moquin,
175 F.Supp.2d 315, 324, n. 10 (D. Conn. 2001).
133915 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
134Id. at 1536-7. The taking here involved the loss of value in the turkeys as they were purchased for use in hatching eggs but
were sold as meat because it was forbidden to sell the eggs interstate during the quarantine.
135816 F.2d 907 (3d Cir. 1987).
136E.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct. 246 (1928) (justifying use of police power to protect public interest).
34without the beneﬁt of the statute.137Ultimately, the court bases its decision to deny Empire compensation
on the need to maintain public health and the fact that Empire suﬀered a diminution in the value of its
property rather than a total loss.138
Clearly, the federal courts are not in agreement as to what factors constitute a taking, even when, as here, the
factual situations were essentially identical. The Third Circuit seemed to rely on public safety considerations.
The Federal Circuit, in looking toward the Yancey’s interests, set out three classic factors to be considered in
determining whether a taking occurred: “the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” “the extent
to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,” and “the character of
the governmental action.”139It is unclear, however, the extent to which it actually relied on these factors. A
pair of commentators has suggested that it was considerations of fairness that motivated the court to rule in
favor of the Yanceys.140Depending on how the courts frame the issue, in terms of well-meaning government
actors or poor farmers, opposite results may be reached, but no distinct legal principle relied on by either
1379 C.F.R. § 81.15 (1984). Empire, 816 F.2d at 911 n.4.
138Empire, 816 F.2d at 915-6.
139Yancey, 915 F.2d at 1549, citing the seminal case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2649 (1978).
140They write:
[I]t could be argued that the Yanceys lost on all three prongs of the [Penn Central] analysis. First, the governmental purpose
was critical and the nexus was clear. Second, the diminution of value of the property was only seventy seven percent. Third, it
could be said that owners of poultry farms should anticipate USDA regulations which could adversely aﬀect their investment
decisions. Nevertheless, this case...illustrates the point that the overarching concern of the court in the takings inquiry is
the underlying equity of the situation. In Yancey, the turkey farm owners had started the business just one month before the
quarantine was put into eﬀect. More importantly, they were a small “mom and pop” operation that was put out of business
as a result of the quarantine, although not a single one of their turkeys or eggs was infected with the virus. The court clearly
considered unfair the governmental policy of reimbursing only those poultry owners with diseased stock. Therefore, the court’s
factual inquiry found a constitutional means of redressing the inequity.”
Roger J. Marzulla & Nancie G. Marzulla, Regulatory Takings in the United States Claims Court: Adjusting the Burdens that
in Fairness and Equity Ought to be Borne by Society as a Whole, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. 549, 564-65 (Spring 1991) (arguing
that the Claims Court has been successful at resolving takings claims based on ad hoc equity considerations).
35court emerges. It does appear that the courts analyzed the speciﬁc facts closely in order to fairly balance
the public versus private interest. Marzulla and Marzulla describe the balance achieved in Yancey and
other Federal Circuit cases as follows: “[T]akings jurisprudence in the Claims Court has developed into a
very specialized and fact-intensive process which focuses on the equitable adjustment of the burdens that
‘in fairness ought to be borne by society as a whole rather than [by] an individual property owner.”’141This
sort of close factual analysis in conjunction with a balancing process could be important in the food and
drug context, as it the importance of weighing the speciﬁc governmental interest against the speciﬁc private
interest has already been noted. The takings cases discussed thus far, however, involved deprivations that
were the result of inﬂuences outside the control of both parties. A very diﬀerent balancing process comes
into play if we ask, what if one or the other party is culpable?
One such situation is a criminal trial – either the state or the accused will eventually be vindicated. A good
example of the takings question in the criminal context is when evidence is seized in anticipation of a trial.
In Emery v. State,142for example, the plaintiﬀ’s truck was seized and dismantled as part of an investigation
into a potential murder. After the plaintiﬀ plead to a lesser crime, the truck was returned to him in damaged
condition.143The trial court ruled that the loss in value of the truck constituted a compensable taking, and
awarded the plaintiﬀ damages.144The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, determining that the obligation to
141Id. at 565 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)) (emphasis added).
142688 P.2d 72 (Or. 1984).
143Id. at 73-74.
144Id. at 75. The trial court determined that the seizure was a taking under the Oregon constitution. Nevertheless, the Oregon
Supreme Court notes at 77, that the provision in the state constitution is coextensive with the federal version, and relies for its
holding on a federal case involving the Fifth Amendment.
36provide evidence in a criminal case is a public duty.145Turning evidence over for trial is a function of being a
member of the society, since every citizen can potentially be in the position in which Emery found himself.
Yet, there is an implicit acknowledgement that the accused is in a sense individually responsible for the
predicament, that all members of society are not equally likely to be in Emery’s place, as otherwise it would
make sense to shift the burden to society as a whole.
There are two strong dissents in Emery, both of which emphasize the constitutional arguments for providing
compensation to the plaintiﬀ. Justice Linde (joined by Justice Lent) remarks:
[T]he state doubtless would have to pay compensation if it used plaintiﬀs’ pickup truck for
some other public purpose, for instance for transportation, and the compensation would
take into account any diminution in value from wear and tear or damage during the state’s
use.146
Hence he calls into question the extent to which public use means public necessity, and the extent to which
use in a criminal trial can be accurately described as the former.
The dissenters also emphasize that the case may be used as precedent for the proposition that innocent
third parties need not be compensated for their losses, even if they are crime victims.147In a Note in the
Northwestern University Law Review, Spencer M. Punnett II writes about the dissenters’ concern for innocent
parties.148He also describes how the fear of rewarding criminals motivated the majority:
The state of Oregon’s concern, however, was made manifest by the appellate judge in Emery,
who described the state’s appeal to him as imbued with a ‘sense of outrage’ that a criminal
should recover damages for police actions that were reasonably necessary in order to gather
evidence toward his conviction.149
145Id. at 78.
147See id., at 81. Cf. Wallace v. City of Atlantic City, 608 A.2d 480 (N.J. Super. Law Div. 1992) (holding that damage
caused to innocent third party landlord’s property during police search constituted a compensable taking).
148“As one dissenting justice pointed out, under the Emery rule, the property that is destroyed for evidentiary purposes without
compensation might belong to a bystander or even to the victim of the crime – adding further to the victim’s suﬀering.” Spencer
M. Punnett II, Note, The ‘Takings’ Clause and the Duty to Provide Evidence: An Alternative Analysis of Emery V. State, 80
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1094 (Winter 1986).
37This fear of rewarding wrongdoers might be rational, but not to the extent that it fails to recognize that
the innocent are generally not as culpable as ‘proven’ criminals. The dissenting justices get this to a degree;
however, they do not make the leap from bystanders and victims to the wrongfully accused. Yet there
is no fundamental reason to distinguish between them.150The Note proposes a procedural mechanism for
separating the innocent from the guilty that will be examined later in the paper.151At this point, it is
important to ask whether we would rather err on the side of one or the other of the parties. The Emery
dissents suggest that the rule should favor compensation to the general populace (even the culpable Mr.
Emery) in order to protect the innocent, while the majority seems to favor a blanket rule that defers to
governmental interest, framed as respect for the police power and public safety.
D. The Tucker Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act: Getting into Court
The entire discussion to this point is only relevant if there is someone to sue. As noted earlier in regard to
Miller v. Horton, the responsibility for a taking may lie in several places. In some states, if an oﬃcial is
acting within the scope of her oﬃcial duties, she is entitled to qualiﬁed immunity, assuming she does not act
in bad faith or with malice.152A formulation in the federal context suggests that government oﬃcials may
150The Note, on the other hand, while not focusing on the wrongfully accused, does mention him in passing. 80 Nw. U. L.
Rev. at 1110.
151See part III, F, infra.
152See, e.g., Friend v. Brankatelli, 482 N.E.2d 1284, 1285 (Ohio App. 1984) (holding that apartment owner’s suit against
public oﬃcials was barred for owner’s failure to ﬁrst pursue administrative remedies); Gildea v. Ellershaw, 298 N.E.2d 847,
853 (Mass. 1973). Cf. McMahon v. City of Telluride, 244 P. 1017, 1018 (Colo. 1926) (“Where the property is not in fact
a nuisance, if the city is not liable in tort, because of the rule above mentioned and relied on by the city in the instant case
[which protects the government when acting under its police powers], the municipality is nevertheless liable upon the theory
that it must grant compensation for private property that it takes for public use. If certain property is in fact a nuisance, its
destruction as such may not give rise to any right to compensation; but if property is destroyed under a mistaken belief that it
is a nuisance, when in fact it is not a nuisance, it is taken for a ‘public use’ within the meaning of the constitutional provision,
38only be sued as individuals for violations of “clearly established” rules of federal law.153Still, there is ongoing
debate as to the exact parameters of governmental immunity for oﬃcials in their individual capacities. Our
concern is with the right to sue the government, as well as its agents, in their oﬃcial capacities.
When the FDA seizes someone’s property, it acts under the authority of the government of the United States.
Administrative agencies generally may not be sued for damages.154The United States itself is protected by
sovereign immunity, and therefore, in order to bring suit against it, Congress must have authorized the
action.155There are several sources of law that provide individuals the right to sue the government. In the
context of this paper, the two most important sources are the Tucker Act156and the Federal Tort Claims
Act.157
The Tucker Act has no substantive base, but rather it indicates the type of cases for which the United States
and the loss to the owner should be made good.”).
153“[G]overnment oﬃcials performing functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages in so far as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Tchirkova
v. Kelly, 1998 WL 125542, *8 (E.D.N.Y.,1998) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982)). “Whether
an oﬃcial protected by qualiﬁed immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful oﬃcial action generally turns
on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the action.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038 (1987)
(citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819, 102 S.Ct. at 2739).
154Vigil v. U. S., 293 F.Supp. 1176, 1181 & n.2 (D. Colo. 1968) (dismissing claims against the Departments of Justice,
Interior and Agriculture, and Bureaus of Land Management and Internal Revenue, as well as the Civil Rights Commission).
The Administrative Procedure Act does not give individuals the right to sue the government for monetary damages based
on agency action, but only for relief other than monetary damages. Although there is some confusion as to what constitutes
monetary damages, compensation for lost or damaged property falls under that deﬁnition. If the individual is seeking a return
of his property rather than monetary damages, however, the APA could provide an avenue for relief. U.S. v. Chambers, 92
F.Supp.2d 396, 399-400 (D. N.J. 2000) (denying individual compensation for property not returned to him after his arrest and
conviction for drug crimes).
155See, e.g., Martyniuk v. Com. of Pa., 282 F.Supp. 252, 255 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (“It is now well settled that civil liability may
not be imposed upon the sovereign except to the extent and in the manner to which it has consented”).
15628 U.S.C. § 1491.
15728 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. (1994) (in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)).
39has consented to suit.158Hence, in the case of a taking without compensation, the constitutional violation
is what gives rise to the Tucker Act claim. Suits under the Tucker Act that are for more than $10,000
must be brought in the United States Court of Federal Claims (hereinafter Claims Court).159The eﬀect of
this is to limit the number of courts that see cases of a certain type, and to make decisions of the Claims
Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit essentially the doctrinal authority on certain issues.
The just compensation claim in Yancey is an example of a suit brought under the Tucker Act ﬁrst in the
Claims Court and then in the Federal Circuit on appeal. It may be apparent from the discussion of that
case, however, that the general rule just stated has exceptions, for Empire was in fact a case from a diﬀerent
circuit addressing the same issue as that in Yancey. The explanation lies in procedural missteps, as Circuit
Judge Sloviter explains in his Empire concurrence:
[T]he procedure followed in the district court by the plaintiﬀ and by the federal defendants
unnecessarily muddled the procedural posture of this case.... [T]he claim against the federal
oﬃcials in their oﬃcial capacities [as opposed to in their individual capacities, which is not
covered under the Act] was one for money damages in excess of $10,000 and, therefore,
properly should have been brought in Claims Court.160
Although in this instance the Third Circuit determined that it had jurisdiction because the district court
had not purported to pass on any Tucker Act claim,161the Claims Court tends to have jurisdiction in these
types of matters.
The other basis for suit, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), does not rely on the constitutional grounds
15828 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) reads in part: “The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment
upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of
an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated
damages in cases not sounding in tort.”
159Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a), “The Little Tucker Act,” granting jurisdiction to the district courts in such matters where the
amount in dispute is less than $10,000. On the other hand, the Claims Court may hear such cases regardless of the amount in
dispute. See Wesreco, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 618 F.Supp. 562, 568 (D. Utah 1985).
161Id. at 917.
40discussed thus far. The FTCA allows an individual to sue the government in certain instances as though
it were a regular tortfeasor. An agency that seizes and damages (or lets rot) an owner’s goods might ﬁt
that description. Unfortunately, the Act contains a provision that can severely limit a claimant’s chances.
28 U.S.C. § 2465 explicitly limits the rights of a claimant where the government has reasonable cause for
seizing her property.162There is also a question whether the government is immune from liability under the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA,163which excuses government agents whose actions involve
a measure of discretion,164or the detention exception,165which protects agents involved in the detention of
goods.166 To better understand these statutes, it is useful to look at an example. One case that illustrates
their usage is Jarboe-Lackey Feedlots, Inc. v. United States.167The United States ﬁled an action under the
16228 U.S.C. § 2465 reads in pertinent part:
(a) Upon the entry of a judgment for the claimant in any proceeding to condemn or forfeit property seized or arrested under
any provision of Federal law –
(1) such property shall be returned forthwith to the claimant or his agent; and
(2) if it appears that there was reasonable cause for the seizure or arrest, the court shall cause a proper certiﬁcate thereof to
be entered and, in such case, neither the person who made the seizure or arrest nor the prosecutor shall be liable to suit or
judgment on account of such suit or prosecution, nor shall the claimant be entitled to costs, except as provided in subsection
(b).
(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), in any civil proceeding to forfeit property under any provision of Federal law in
which the claimant substantially prevails, the United States shall be liable for–
(A) reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred by the claimant;
(B) post-judgment interest, as set forth in section 1961 of this title;...
...
(2)(D) If the court enters judgment in part for the claimant and in part for the Government, the court shall reduce the award
of costs and attorney fees accordingly.
16328 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Section 2680 relates to the FTCA and the Little Tucker Act.
164See, e.g., Bub Davis Packing Co., Inc. v. United States, 443 F.Supp. 589 (W.D. Texas 1977) (holding that Department
of Agriculture’s investigation of plaintiﬀ’s factory was a discretionary function under the Act). But see Sandrini Brothers v.
Voss, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that seizure action by state agency of allegedly adulterated grapes was
ministerial rather than discretionary).
16528 U.S.C. § 2680(c). Section 2680 relates to the FTCA and the Little Tucker Act.
166See, e.g., Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. U.S., 777 F.2d 822, 823 (2d Cir. 1985) (denying damages where claimants car
was destroyed by DEA conducting drug search). The Second Circuit noted that there is some disagreement as to whether §
2680(c) applies to all seizures or merely those involving the collection of taxes or custom duties. Nevertheless, it held that in
this case the exception would apply. See also S. Schonfeld Company, Inc. v. SS Akra Tenaron, 363 F.Supp. 1220 (D. South
Carolina 1973). In that case, the claimant sued the government for negligently handling its cargo during a lawful detention.
The government defended its actions under both § 2680(a) and (c). The court held that the discretionary exception did not
apply because the damage had been done after the agent had exercised his discretion, but that the detention exception did
work to immunize the government.
1677 Cl. Ct. 329 (1985).
41Federal Meat Inspection Act to seize 273 of the plaintiﬀ’s steers, which it believed to be illegally implanted
with diethylstilbestrol (DES).168Although there was evidence that the claimant had been doping its livestock,
the district court ultimately determined that the government had failed to make out its case against the
claimant.169It directed that the government return the beef and pay costs, including storage, and noted that
because the beef lost value due to the government’s action, the plaintiﬀ could bring a claim “either under
the provisions of the Federal Tort Claim Act [sic] or perhaps within the framework of this litigation.”170The
Tenth Circuit, reviewing Jarboe-Lackey’s claim under the FTCA, determined that the government had not
consented to waive its immunity for this type of case under the Act, but that a Tucker Act claim might still
be available.171Jarboe-Lackey then sued as required in the Claims Court, pursuing the Tucker Act remedy
as well as other possible remedies.
The Claims Court ﬁrst addressed Jarboe-Lackey’s FTCA claim. The plaintiﬀ argued that the seizure was
wrongful and therefore in dereliction of 28 U.S.C. § 2465, which limits damages for reasonable government
seizures.172The plaintiﬀ proceeded on the grounds that no certiﬁcate of reasonableness had been issued by
168Id. at 331-2.
169United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef Weighing Approximately 154,121 Pounds, 516 F.Supp 321, 342 (D. Kansas
1981).
170Id. at 351.
171U.S. v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef, Weighing Approximately 154,121 Pounds, 726 F.2d 1481, 1490-91 (10th Cir. 1984).
172This is a slightly diﬀerent ground than that relied upon by the Tenth Circuit, which cited the detention exception, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(c). A good comparison case under the FD&C Act is United States v. 1500 Cases, More or Less, 249 F.2d 382 (7th
Cir. 1957). In that case, the Campbell Soup Company rejected the Smith Canning Company’s tomatoes after learning that
the FDA was investigating the goods for adulteration. Smith had to reroute and store the tomatoes in response, and, after it
was determined by the Seventh Circuit that one batch was adulterated and one was not, the company sued for damages for its
pre-seizure costs. Smith claimed that the FTCA was applicable because the FDA’s seizure was wrongful. The court held that
the claims were barred by both § 2680(c) and § 2465. It did not fully distinguish between these two sections beyond explaining
that as to § 2465, there was evidence that the seizure was reasonable. The impression one gets from the case is that the seizure
was reasonable, so that the government was immune under § 2465, but that even if it the seizure had not been reasonable, the
government would still have been immune under § 2680(c). This paradoxical result suggests to me that § 2680(c) was applied
42the district court as required by the statute and that therefore the seizure was in fact wrongful under that
section; the court rejected this argument by pointing out that even if no certiﬁcate issued, the district court
had otherwise found that the government had behaved reasonably in pursuing the seizure.173Hence, the
lack of a certiﬁcate would not be determinative.174 Nevertheless, there is some authority that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2465 would not preclude recovery in a suit for compensation. In U.S. v. One 1965 Chevrolet Impala
Convertible,175the Internal Revenue Service seized two cars for forfeiture, but the judgment of forfeiture
was eventually vacated. The claimants sued for recovery of the amount lost from depreciation during the
detention. The Sixth Circuit sustained the award apparently relying on a takings argument, but it held that
even though the government had acted reasonably, § 2465 would not bar recovery as it deemed the “costs”
delineated in the statute were merely “court costs and costs incident to the seizure,” but not the “value of
the property itself at the time it was seized.”176The court in Jarboe-Lackey appears to support this deﬁnition
of costs, but it interprets § 2465 as a positive grant of rights rather than an obstacle to recovery. The Sixth
Circuit’s rationale requires another source of rights (e.g., the Fifth Amendment) in order to recover damages,
but in their estimation, § 2465 will not be a bar to that award. The Claims Court, conversely, allows one
to recover under § 2465 itself, but only if the government did not act reasonably and then only court costs
improperly by the Seventh Circuit in this case, as well as by the Tenth Circuit in 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef and the Second
Circuit in Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. U.S., 777 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1985) (supra note 166). It is a canon of construction to
give the statutes independent meaning; as such, the suggestion by the Second Circuit in Formula One that § 2680(c) applies
only to detentions for the purpose of collecting taxes or customs duties seems to be the more logical approach. Nevertheless,
this does not appear to be the general consensus. Cf. S. Schonfeld Company, Inc. v. SS Akra Tenaron, 363 F.Supp. 1220,
1222-25 (D. South Carolina 1973) (ﬁnding that the expansive reading of § 2680 is the general rule).
173This determination had been made in relation to a determination under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412 (Supp.1983), regarding attorney’s fees. The district court denied fees under the EAJA on the basis that the seizure was
“substantially justiﬁed.” 726 F.2d at 1483 (describing district court proceeding).
174See also, 1500 Cases, More or Less, 249 F.2d 382, 384 (7th Cir. 1957).
175475 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1973).
176Id. at 886 n.3.
43and costs incident to seizure (i.e., not the “diminished value of the res”177).178 Since the Jarboe-Lackey
court viewed 28 U.S.C. § 2465 as a positive grant of rights, the failure of the plaintiﬀ to prevail under that
section did not prevent them from pursuing other theories of recovery. The Claims Court next addressed
the takings claim. As noted, the United States has consented to be sued on constitutional grounds under
the Tucker Act. The court recognized the importance of the right to compensation, and cited several cases
supporting that right.179Nevertheless, after a quick review of the police power, it dispensed with the Fifth
Amendment claim:
The seizure power with respect to meat that may be adulterated is intended to prevent a
harm – a health hazard – to the public. Thus, the seizure and detention of plaintiﬀ’s beef
until released by the court presiding over the condemnation action is not actionable as a
taking.180
The court did not do an extended analysis of the equities in this case, but rather deferred easily to public
interest considerations. Perhaps the court was motivated by some of the same factors that led the court in
Emery to deny the criminally accused any compensation after his plea bargain; after all, despite the ﬁnding
by the district court, the Jarboe-Lackey court referred constantly to the fact that the meat in question was
“unlawfully implanted with a prohibited drug.”181 The court also ruled on the plaintiﬀ’s claim that it was
entitled to recover under an implied-in-fact contract theory; that is, that “a contract implied in fact arose
from the seizure whereby defendant agreed to return plaintiﬀ’s beef at is sale value.”182Such a claim would
177Jarboe-Lackey Feedlots, Inc. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 329, 336-37 (1985).
178See also U.S. v. One (1) 1979 Cadillac Coupe De Ville VIN 6D4799266999, 833 F.2d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (disagreeing
with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in One 1965 Chevrolet Impala Convertible on the grounds that “the court dealt with section
2465 only in passing, and the government’s argument was that the section prohibited the award of damages rather than, as
here, that it does not authorize the award”).
179Jarboe-Lackey, 7 Cl. Ct. at 338. E.g., North American Cold Storage Company v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 29 S.Ct.
101 (1908), Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 69 S.Ct. 1434 (1949).
181Jarboe-Lackey, 7 Cl. Ct. at 339. See also id. at 340 (“...it is not reasonable to anticipate that beef bearing illegal implants
will not be detained long enough to try and decide a condemnation action.”).
182Id.
44also presumably be brought under the Tucker Act. The court rejected this theory based on the propositions
that the plaintiﬀ could have no expectation its goods would be returned, and that no agent had the authority
to bind the government to pay for the lost value of the property.183 Although the government was not acting
under the FD&C Act in this particular instance, the facts in Jarboe-Lackey allow one to predict what might
happen in a typical takings case brought against the government for unlawful seizure by the FDA. This is
especially true given the Tucker Act’s strictures that such a claim, if for more than $10,000, must be brought
in the Claims Court, the court that adjudicated Jarboe-Lackey’s takings claim. Jarboe-Lackey may not bind
a court, and perhaps better facts would sway a judge to consider the equities on the claimant’s side more
fully; nevertheless, the outlook is bleak for a property owner pursuing compensation in federal court.
E. Proceedings under State Law
An owner may have better luck under state law. One clear example that emerges in the case law is Sandrini
Brothers v. Voss.184In that case, grapes were seized under state law185as having been treated with an “eco-
nomic poison.” Despite some diﬀerences between the FD&C Act and California food statute,186they are sim-
ilar; the latter protects the public from any “hazard to human health or the environment”187and from owners
attempting to secure an “unfair business advantage,”188and therefore can be generally analogized to the for-
183Id. at 340.
1849 Cal.Rptr.2d 763 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
185Cal. Food and Agriculture Code § 12648.
186The California provision allows articles that have been sprayed with an unregistered pesticide to be declared by the Director
of the Department of Food and Agriculture as a “public nuisance” and seized. Cal. Food and Agriculture Code § 12648.
187Cal. Food and Agriculture Code § 12648(b)(1).
188Cal. Food and Agriculture Code § 12648(b)(2).
45mer with its provisions on adulteration and misbranding. 189Withoutreachingadecisiononthevalidityofthecondemnationaction,thetrialcourtin
Sandrini held the relevant California provision unconstitutional on its face as a violation of the state consti-
tution’s due process clause.190The court determined, based on its reading of two California cases, Menefee &
Son v. Department of Food and Agriculture191and Skelly v. State Personnel Bd.,192that certain procedural
mechanisms were necessary to provide due process, including notice, hearing, and (where applicable) com-
pensation. Skelly involved the process due to an employee before being terminated from his job.193Menefee
held unconstitutional, based on its lack of the previously described procedural mechanisms (such as notice),
the forerunner to the statute at issue in Sandrini.194 The trial court in Sandrini had held that the statute
needed speciﬁcally to provide a mechanism to compensate for wrongful seizures.195The appellate court took
a narrower view, holding that the statute would not have to spell out the mechanism for compensation as
long as one existed.196In other words, if there was a way for a complainant to procure compensation through
other channels set up by the judicial system, there did not need to be a speciﬁc procedure authorized by
the seizure statute. In this case, the court determined that the complainant had a method for recompense
whether through a formal197or informal198hearing, and that the statute was therefore constitutional.
189The statute was amended in response to the court’s decision in Menefee & Son v. Department of Food and Agriculture, 245
Cal.Rptr. 166 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding predecessor version of Cal. Food and Agriculture Code § 12648 unconstitutional).
The language cited herein, however, applies to both the current and the previous versions of the statute.
190Sandrini Brothers v. Voss, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 763, 764 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
191245 Cal.Rptr. 166 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
192124 Cal.Rptr. 14, 539 P.2d 774 (Cal. 1975).
193Id.
194245 Cal.Rptr. at 168.
195Sandrini, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d at 766.
196Id. at 767.
197“[R]eview by a court in a mandamus proceeding pursuant to [Cal.] Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 (§ 12648, subd.
(d)).” Id.
198“[A]n administrative hearing before the director (§ 12648, subd. (c))....” Id.
46The principal expounded in this case is key: that there must be some means by which a wrongfully deprived
owner can be compensated for her loss.199This is a far cry from a case such as Jarboe-Lackey, wherein the
court could nonchalantly point to the state’s police powers as a safeguard to governmental action. Relying
on the California constitution’s due process clause,200rather than its just compensation clause,201the court
came to a very diﬀerent conclusion than the Jarboe-Lackey court, relying on federal provisions. The Sandrini
court did not really explain why it believed compensation to be necessary, only that it was required by due
process. In some ways, this does a disservice to those who would use the case as precedent. Unlike the court
in Jarboe-Lackey, which at least acknowledged (before denying the claim) the harm inherent to a seizure
action, the court here failed to articulate good reasons for its rule. Other owners who would use Sandrini to
buttress their contention that compensation is required by law or fairness have a good case to use, but not
much in the way of language.
On the other hand, the ruling is important in that the court was concerned that a mechanism for com-
pensation exist generally. It did not ﬁrst determine the merits of the government’s claim that the grapes
were dangerous, but rather ruled that the ﬁrst thing was to make sure compensation was at least available.
This is a strong push on the individual’s side of the balance, and a positive reinforcement of the individual’s
199The Sandrini court suggests that, under California law, the government is not immune from liability where it functions in
a ministerial as opposed to discretionary manner, and this is how it characterizes the decision of an agent who recommends
seizure. Id. at 769.
200CA CONST Art. 1, § 7.
201CA CONST Art. 1, § 19. The line between the federal or a state due process clause and just compensation clause is often
blurred. For example, it has long been held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantees include the right to just
compensation in the event of a taking. See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-37, 17 S.Ct.
581, 584-85 (1897).
47constitutional right – be it of due process or just compensation – over and above the claim of protection of
the public welfare.
This is not to deny the importance of the public well-being; all states recognize the right of the government
to seize property in exercise of its police power when such property may harm people. Some states adhere
to legitimacy of the police power in circumstances where it seems to work to the detriment of the end
consumer it is intended to protect. In State v. 44 Gunny Sacks of Grain,202the court held that it was not a
compensable taking where the state seized adulterated grain from a consumer who had bought it unaware of
the defect, and who had cooperated with the New Mexico Department of Health and Human Services when
it contacted him regarding the problem. The court explained that the law that authorized the seizure was
intended to protect the public, and that it did not specify the circumstances under which the commodity
needed to be found, as the suit was not against the owner of the res but the res itself.203The court easily
dispensed with the takings argument: “Injury which results from the proper exercise of the police power is
not compensable.”204This may seem an odd result. Much of this paper has been devoted to asking whether
the public interest in protection from economic harms is really as important as most courts imply. Here, a
consumer is harmed by his purchase (due to the subsequent seizure of the adulterated product). The law
protects his health, but harms his wallet. Although it is not indicated by the case, the consumer probably
has tort law remedies against the seller. Still, if the government’s concern is in protecting the consumer
from both physical and economic harms, a consistent result might dictate that he be compensated for the




F. Proposed Solutions to the Just Compensation Problem
It is unfair to reject a claimant’s suit for recovery out of hand, based on notions of the police power. It places
the burden too heavily on the wrongly accused, who must bear more than the loss of value to her property.
On the question of incidental costs, consider the case of United States v. 1500 Cases, More or Less.205Upon
learning that the FDA was investigating the Smith Canning Company’s canned tomatoes, the Campbell
Soup Company rejected Smith’s supply. The district court determined that Smith’s tomatoes were not
adulterated, but the Seventh Circuit reversed as to one of the two sets of cans, and rejected Smith’s claim
for pre-seizure costs incident to Campbell’s rejection.206Assume, however, that the district court’s ruling
(that the tomatoes were not adulterated) had stood. Smith not only lost Campbell’s business that day,
but it is possible that Campbell got an entirely new supplier in the meantime (assuming that Smith was a
regular supplier). Moreover, Smith’s reputation was tarnished. Campbell is a big name, and its actions were
bound to have repercussions in the industry. Smith may have lost other business as a result. Its insurance
may have gone up. Its attorneys may have decided to increase their fees. It may have had attorney’s fees
and pre-litigation costs that were not recoverable.207Of course, this is speculation. But some or all of these
205249 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1957), discussed in detail supra, at note 172.
206The government did acknowledge its liability for storage costs during the detention. Id. at 383. The court indicates that
there is no basis for other costs in this case, and refers to United States v. French Sardine Co., Inc., 80 F.2d 325 (9th Cir.
1935), for the proposition that the FD&C Act “does not provide for allowance for costs to a claimant successful in opposing
libels brought by the United States.” 1500 Cases, 249 F.2d at 384.
207See U.S. v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef, Weighing Approximately 154,121 Pounds, 726 F.2d 1481, 1486-87 (10th Cir. 1984)
(denying recovery for attorney’s fees under EAJA). See also Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1543 (1990) (discussing
extra costs).
49possibilities are not unlikely. When an aggrieved claimant sues for compensation, she is only suing for the
actual decline in value of her property; a whole wealth of costs may never even be addressed. She is only
asking for a slice of the pie.
As such, it seems that the courts should ﬁnd another solution. In the context of seizures of evidence for
criminal trials, Spencer M. Punnett II has proposed the following system:
Procedurally, the plaintiﬀ’s culpability in the underlying oﬀense could be an aﬃrmative
defense for the government. The burden would be on the state to show, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the plaintiﬀ had committed a wrongful act substantially related to the
subject of the investigation that caused the damage. ¶This showing of culpability would
be independent of any criminal trial. Under some circumstances, the burden of establishing
the plaintiﬀ’s culpability under the lower ’preponderance’ standard could mean a ﬁnding of
no duty to compensate, even when the plaintiﬀ was not convicted of any oﬀense. Likewise,
the plaintiﬀ might succeed with the ‘takings’ action even though he had been convicted
criminally.208
Punnett’s suggestion works well in the criminal context because of two factors: ﬁrst, the burden of proof in
criminal trials is diﬀerent than in his proposed hearings, hence those who seem to be involved in a crime
but cannot be convicted beyond a reasonable doubt could still lose their property rights; second, innocent
victims and bystanders who bear no culpability should win easily. Although the mechanism he proposes
cannot be translated precisely to the food and drug context, the logic is important. Punnett essentially
proposes a method to frame the issue. He suggests decision-makers tilt the balance toward the public interest
or the private interest depending on who wins the underlying determination, but that it also consider all
the relevant facts. In the case of Jarboe-Lackey, for example, the court’s intuition that Jarboe-Lackey was
not wholly innocent would be an important consideration. The Sandrini court’s sense that Sandrini was not
really at fault is also important. A blanket rule that awarded damages in all cases in which the basis for the
50seizure was invalidated would recognize the latter intuition but not the former. The Jarboe-Lackey rule has
the opposite inﬁrmity.
A possible remedy may be to have an administrative ﬁnding on the issue, to be reviewable by the court.
This would preserve judicial resources and force the agencies to act carefully to avoid taxing theirs. Of
course, this would essentially emphasize the discretionary nature of such a determination, but the necessity
of discretion is at the heart of the issue. Such a solution would also require a quibble on the constitutional
question of what constitutes a taking, or else it would need to bypass the question altogether by providing
a statutory means for recovery where such recovery would be reasonable under the circumstances. Other
solutions are possible. The important thing is to recognize the often disregarded but very real interests on
the side of the claimant.
As a side note, the Yancey court explains that the appropriate determination for damages is Fair Market
Value at the time of the taking (minus, one presumes, the value at the time of recovery if there is any).209Lost
proﬁts are generally not recoverable.210Although this might hurt a company like Smith, as described, it is
an easier calculation, and appropriate in this context.
209Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1542-43 (1990).
210Id. at 1542.
51IV. A Slight Diversion: The Fourth Amendment Although the thrust of this paper has been
to analyze the relationship between FDA seizures and the Fifth Amendment, it is helpful to
examine brieﬂy the impact of the Fourth Amendment in this context. The Fourth Amendment,
because it relates to whether and how goods may be seized, is closely tied to the concerns
already noted in this paper, particularly in regard to due process.
The Fourth Amendment, although traditionally seen in the criminal procedure context, applies to civil
proceedings as well.211As noted by Judge Skelly-Wright of the D.C. Circuit, the requirement of a libel of
information is intended to ensure that FDA action is reasonable. In Founding Church of Scientology of
Washington, D.C. v. United States, he found that the libel ﬁled by the government was fair, in that it
“particularly described the items to be seized, and gave a reasonably particularly account of the respects in
which they were thought to contravene the Act.”212The procedure just described, however, is not the same
as a hearing with both parties present. The target of the libel does not have the opportunity to present her
side, and, as discussed, she may not until after the seizure.
It is unclear the extent to which, moreover, a warrant must issue on probable cause. Judge Skelly-Wright’s
opinion seems to indicate that the determination merely needs to ensure that the condemnation action
211Consider Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C. v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The
court, per Skelly-Wright, said:
Though warrants are generally necessary for arrests of persons and for searches, the warrant requirement has not traditionally
been imposed upon seizures of the type involved in this case – attachment of property in the course of civil proceedings. This does
not mean that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to such seizures, in both its substantive prohibition against unreasonable
seizures and its procedural requirement of judicial or quasi-judicial review of the decision to seize. It means merely that judicial
restraint is imposed through a diﬀerent form of proceeding that the showing of probable cause before a magistrate. In the
case of ordinary civil attachments, the details of such proceedings are, even in the federal courts, left to state law. In cases in
admiralty, the process is governed by the Admiralty Rules....
Id. at 1150.
212Id.
52is reasonable.213Even then courts do not always require precision.214Justice Skelly-Wright’s formulation is
strengthened by the fact that most FDA seizures do not invade the privacy of the home,215the preservation of
which is at the heart of the Fourth Amendment.216Where a seizure may more drastically aﬀect an individual’s
privacy, the protections of the Amendment will more likely be applicable.217On the other hand, public entities
that are “closely regulated” industries generally receive less protection.218 An illegal seizure, moreover,
does not necessarily immunize the goods from forfeiture. The government can still condemn the property
where suﬃcient independent (i.e., untainted) evidence exists.219
To say that the system does not protect all owners in every case is not to imply that the discretion of FDA
agents is unlimited. FDA agents may be constrained by internal FDA regulations and supervision. As noted
213Id. Cf. United States v. Articles of Hazardous Substance, 588 F.2d 39, 42-43 (4th Cir. 1978) (citing with approval
Judge Skelly-Wright’s analysis in upholding seizure under Federal Hazardous Substances Act, but indicating that government’s
actions indicated probable cause even if warrant was issued by clerk, rather than by an independent judicial oﬃcer establishing
probable cause). See also United States v. Articles of Drug.. Wans, 526 F.Supp. 703, 706 (D. Puerto Rico 1981) (compliance
with the requirements of Rule(C) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims [i.e., ﬁling a libel with
the Clerk of the Court rather than a judicial oﬃcer] is suﬃcient for Fourth Amendment purposes).
214See, U.S. v. 780 Cases, More or Less, of Latex Surgeons’ Gloves, an Article of Device, 799 F.Supp. 1275, 1298 (D. Puerto
Rico 1992) (“Seizures brought under the Act are initiated in conformity with the rules of admiralty. 21 U.S.C. § 334(b);
Fed.R.Civ.P., Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, Rule C(2) and (3). Rule C(2) requires only that a complaint
describe with “reasonable particularity” the property that is the subject of the action. On its face, this rule contemplates a less
than exact identiﬁcation of the articles to be seized....Hence, the rule does not anticipate an exact description of each item to
be seized.”).
215See, e.g., Articles of Hazardous Substance, 588 F.2d at 39.
216See, e.g., Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 37-38, 40, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 2045, 2046 (emphasizing the “sanctity of the home” in
holding unconstitutional police’s use of thermal imaging technology to determine whether an individual was growing marijuana
in his house).
217U. S. v. Device More or Less Labeled Theramatic, 641 F.2d 1289, 1291 (9th Cir. 1981) (seizure of device from neurosurgeon’s
oﬃce violated Fourth Amendment; seizure in home or oﬃce requires greater procedural protection), appeal after remand, U.S.
v. An Article of Device Theramatic, 715 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom., Cloward v. U.S., 465 U.S. 1025,
104 S.Ct. 1281 (1984).
218See, e.g., United States v. Argent Chemical Laboratories, 93 F.3d 572, 575-77 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding seizure of
allegedly adulterated veterinary drugs under the so-called Colonnade-Biswell exception, which allows “warrantless searches and
seizures on commercial property used in ‘closely regulated’ industries”).
219U.S. v. An Article of Device Theramatic, 715 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1983).
53by the court in United States v. Argent Chemical Laboratories, Inc.,
[I]n most cases, the seizure is subject to the approval of one of the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration’s district oﬃces, the appropriate oﬃce (or “center”) in the Food and Drug
Administration headquarters, the Food and Drug Administration’s Oﬃce of Enforcement,
the Oﬃce of the Chief Counsel, and the Department of Justice.220
Given the narrow window of protection aﬀorded by the courts under the Fourth Amendment, especially in
light of the due process decisions on notice and hearing, agency discretion is still an owner’s best friend.
The apparent ease with which the FDA can act against a potentially unlawful producer is reassuring to the
consumer, but for the producer, it is so only to the extent that she has faith in administrative authority.
V. Conclusion
The system may be described as bent but not broken. The seizure power is not wielded constantly, although
it may dangle over the heads of some owners like the sword of Damocles. Although the system functions
adequately, it could be made to work better. The issuing of warrants on less than probable cause, coupled
with post-seizure hearings and a limited right of recompense, although all small potatoes in their own right,
together can amount to a genuine burden on the aﬀected property owner. Seizure is a weapon: “Some
litigators believe that if there is an advantage to be taken, it should be taken. Whatever the propriety of
that view in ordinary civil litigation between private parties, it is to be hoped that governmental agencies
such as the FDA would take a diﬀerent approach.”221 It would not tax FDA or judicial resources too
greatly to consider the rights of the wrongly accused owner, or the potentially wrongly accused, a little more
carefully.
221Buc, supra note 20, at 152 (arguing for use of injunctions instead of seizures).
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